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Three Kinds of Fault: Understanding the
Purpose and Function of Causation in
Tort Law
MARIN R. SCORDATO*
Causation is a concept of enormous importance in the law.
In just the last two years, the United States Supreme Court
has explicitly considered its importance and meaning on at
least three occasions, in areas of the law as diverse as specific personal jurisdiction, Title IX, and Section 1981. It has
also been the subject of sustained scholarly examination and
debate.
In no area of the law is causation as foundational and omnipresent as in tort law, and in no sphere within tort law is it
more prevalent than in its dominant cause of action, negligence. Unsurprisingly then, the causation requirement in
tort law, and in negligence, has received a great deal of attention and analysis by both courts and commentators. Nevertheless, there remains a striking lack of consensus regarding the causation requirement, ranging from disagreement
about the basic rationale for its existence as a part of the
negligence claim, to the more specific details of its doctrinal
organization and articulation.
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Victoria, Mr. B, and Ellie. All errors and omissions are mine.
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This Article contributes to this ongoing discussion by offering an account of the causation requirement in negligence
that places at its core the role that requiring causation plays
in seeking to restrict the formal liability generated by the
negligence tort to only those defendants who are deemed to
be genuinely socially responsible for the harm suffered by
the plaintiff. On this account, causation exists as part of the
prima facie case for negligence, and in tort law more generally, as a means of ensuring that all liable defendants possess a particular kind of fault with respect to the injury suffered by the plaintiff.
In developing this understanding of causation in negligence,
the Article identifies three different kinds of fault that a defendant might have regarding a given harm, demonstrates
how a workable system of injury compensation could exist
that requires only one, and explains how and why the causation requirement operates to ensure that negligence liability is conditioned upon the presence of all three. Moreover,
the Article describes how the long-standing doctrinal features of the causation requirement, including its best-known
exceptions, can best be understood as serving this underlying policy purpose. Additionally, suggestions for improving
the effectiveness of causation doctrine that follow from this
analysis are identified and discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, there has been significant renewed interest
in the topic of causation and more specifically in the causation requirement of tort law.1 This renewed interest is evidenced in both
scholarly literature and appellate court opinions, including recent repeated reliance on the doctrine by the United States Supreme Court
in a variety of contexts.2
1

See generally Robert G. Schwemm, Fair Housing and the Causation
Standard After Comcast, 66 VILL. L. REV. 63, 70–81 (2021) (exploring but-for
and alternative causation standards); Noah Smith-Drelich, Performative Causation, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 379, 383–90 (2020) (discussing specific causation); Hillel
J. Bavli, Counterfactual Causation, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 879, 884–93 (2019) (evaluating the but-for standard in multiple-sufficient-cause situations); Note, Rethinking Actual Causation in Tort Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2163, 2163 (2017) (“It is
perhaps unsurprising then that causation in tort law has been subject to rigorous
analysis over the years by legal commentators and the courts.”); CAUSATION IN
EUROPEAN TORT LAW 3 (Marta Infantino & Eleni Zervogianni eds., 2017)
(“[Q]uestions lying beneath the assessment of causation are manifold.”); J. Shahar
Dillbary, Causation Actually, 51 GA. L. REV. 1, 30–36 (2016) (focusing on causation and the but-for test); Richard W. Wright & Ingeborg Puppe, Causation: Linguistic, Philosophical, Legal, and Economic, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 461, 462
(2016) (surveying “the linguistic, philosophical, legal, and economic usages and
analyses of the concept of causation.”); Florence G’sell, Causation, Counterfactuals and Probabilities in Philosophy and Legal Thinking, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
503 (2016) (acknowledging the varied theories and counterexamples of causation).
2
Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1026
(2021) (analyzing and ultimately rejecting the assertion that a but-for causation
relationship between the defendant’s in-state activity and the litigation is required
to confer proper specific personal jurisdiction in that state); Bostock v. Clayton
Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020) (asserting that Title IX incorporates the traditional tort standard of but-for causation); Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l. Ass’n. of Afr.
Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1014, 1019 (2020) (establishing that Section
1981 requires a showing that the plaintiff’s race was the but-for cause of its injury)
(“It is ‘textbook tort law’ that a plaintiff seeking redress for a defendant’s legal
wrong typically must prove but-for causation . . . . This ancient and simple ‘but
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Scholars and appellate judges alike are seeking a workable understanding of the causation requirement that reconciles what is
known about black letter causation doctrine with a coherent, rich,
and theoretically satisfying account of the underlying social policies
that the doctrine seeks to advance.3 This is a goal that has been famously elusive.4
This Article contributes to this collective project and to the existing literature by offering a functional and accessible understanding of the causation requirement in tort law; specifically, its purpose,
function, and operation as a requirement of the dominant cause of
action in modern tort law–negligence. No claim is made that the account offered herein is the only way of usefully understanding the
causation requirement, or that it encompasses and explains every
possible valuable insight regarding causation, or even causation in
for’ common law causation test, we have held, supplies the ‘default’ or ‘background’ rule against which Congress is normally presumed to have legislated
when creating its own new causes of action.”); Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S.
204, 210 (2014) (“The law has long considered causation a hybrid concept, consisting of two constituent parts: actual cause and legal cause.”).
3
MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW,
MORALS, AND METAPHYSICS 3–4 (2009) (exploring the difference between the
real world meaning of ‘cause’ and the “technical, distinctively legal” meaning);
Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV. 103, 104
(1911) (“The question is not what philosophers or logicians will say is the cause.
The question is what the courts will regard as the cause.”); Albert Levitt, Cause,
Legal Cause and Proximate Cause, 21 MICH. L. REV. 34, 35 (1922) (distinguishing the course of action the law may follow when “a given person has produced
the cause of the injury to another”); Norris J. Burke, Rules of Legal Cause in Negligence Cases, 15 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2 (1922) (“Various tests of legal cause have
been laid down by the courts.”); Leon Green, Are There Dependable Rules of
Causation?, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 601, 603–04 (1929) (describing the problems of
causation).
4
JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 270 (1992) (“No course in the
first year curriculum is more baffling to the average law student than is torts, and
for good reason. In the first two weeks, the student learns that causation is necessary for both fault and strict liability. Two weeks later the student learns that causation is meaningless, content-free, a mere buzzword. Whereas every torts instructor preaches to students the centrality of causation, virtually no tort theorist takes
causation seriously. Ordinary lawyers and law professors are as confused about
causation and the role it plays in liability and recovery as are their students.”);
Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1737 (1985)
(“In all of tort law, there is no concept which has been as pervasive and yet elusive
as the causation requirement . . . .”).
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tort law. Instead, what follows is an explication of the causation requirement in negligence that seeks to provide courts with a practical
understanding of the requirement that can be productively applied
to the adjudication of actual negligence actions in the United States.
It also offers to students and scholars of the subject a theoretical
foundation underlying the acknowledged doctrine and leading cases
in the area.5

5

See David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 1765, 1799–1800 (1997) (“Law students and working lawyers and judges
need a factual causation approach that is relatively simple, rigorous enough to
yield trustworthy answers, and just sufficiently flexible to avoid egregious injustice.”).
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I.
FIRST-LEVEL CAUSATION DOCTRINE6
In the United States, a prima facie case for the tort of negligence
consists of duty, breach, causation, and harm.7 A claimant seeking
6
Tort law is overwhelmingly state-based common law. This means that even
the most basic of its black-letter doctrine is susceptible to articulation and organization in different—sometimes quite different—ways. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM. § 26 cmt. a, Reporters’ Notes cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2010). As such, the prima facie case for negligence is set forth by different courts and different commentators in various ways,
though there is a high level of agreement on its essential components. For example, the Restatement (Third) of Torts has rejected the Restatement (Second) of
Torts’ use of the term “proximate cause” and places the same basic concept entirely outside of causation, creating an independent element of the prima facie
case that it calls “Limitations on Liability for Tortious Conduct.” Id. at § 29. In so
doing, Restatement (Third) finesses long-standing differences among courts in
conceiving of foreseeability limitations on negligence liability as properly being
part of the duty analysis, or the causation analysis, or both, by pulling the concept
out of both duty and causation requirements and establishing it as a wholly separate element. See infra notes 248–52 and accompanying text.
For the purposes of the analysis offered herein, it makes no significant difference if what I call “proximate cause” is organized as a second required aspect
of the causation requirement, as a means by which legal duty is formally limited,
or both. Similarly, it makes no significant difference for these purposes if what I
call “proximate cause” is referred to by that term or another, or if the black-letter
doctrine is articulated in terms of requiring reasonable foreseeability or some version of a limitation based on the harm that occurred being among the understood
risks of the defendant’s careless behavior. While such differences in organization
and articulation of the relevant doctrine may be important (and well worthy of
analysis and debate), the underlying policy that best rationalizes what I call here
the “proximate cause” requirement, and the fuller understanding of the requirement that follows from that, remains essentially the same under all of these organizational and terminological variations.
I choose to use the specific organization of, and terminology for, the prima
facie case for negligence that I do because one stable version is required to anchor
the explanation and analysis presented herein. Also, because it is my sense (having taught the subject for more than thirty years) that it is among the standard and
conventional ways in which the negligence tort is set forth, if not the current dominant approach among courts and casebooks. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 Reporters’ Note, cmt. a
(AM. L. INST. 2010) (“Factual cause (or cause in fact) and proximate cause remain
in widespread use . . . .”); 4 FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR
S. GRAY, HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 20.2, at 97–98 n.1 (3d ed. 2007)
(“The division of the cause problem, made here, into questions of cause in fact
and of proximate cause . . . represents the prevailing pattern of American legal
thought.”).
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to establish negligence liability against another must, at a minimum,
prove that: (1) the defendant under an actual prior set of circumstances owed to the plaintiff a legal duty to act with a minimum level
of care towards the plaintiff and his or her property; (2) the defendant acted less carefully than the applicable legal duty required; (3)
the defendant’s behavior that fell below the applicable legal standard was the cause of harm; and (4) actual harm to the plaintiff.8
The third of these four required elements—causation—is conventionally understood to consist of two parts, each of which the
plaintiff must independently establish.9 One part is known as actual
7
Hayes v. D.C.I. Props.-D KY, LLC, 563 S.W.3d 619, 622 (Ky. 2018) (“In
any negligence case, a plaintiff must prove the existence of a duty, breach of that
duty, causation between the breach of duty and the plaintiffs injury and
damanges.”); R.I. Res. Recovery Corp. v. Restivo Monacelli LLP., 189 A.3d 539,
546 (R.I. 2018) (“[T]o maintain a cause of cation for negligence, the plaintiff must
establish four elements: (1) a legally cognizable duty owed by defendant to plaintiff; (2) breach of that duty; (3) that the conduct proximately caused the injury;
and (4) actual loss or damage.”); Finazzo v. Fire Equip. Co., 918 N.W.2d 200,
210 (Mich. Ct. App. 2018) (“To establish a prima facie case of negligence, plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff,
(2) a breach of that duty, (3) causation, and (4) damages.”); Lewison v. Renner,
905 N.W.2d 540, 548 (Neb. 2018) (“To prevail in any negligence action, a plaintiff must show a legal duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of such
duty, causation, and resulting damages”).
8
Cunis v. Brennan, 308 N.E.2d 617, 618 (Ill. 1974), citing Mieher v. Brown,
301 N.E.2d 307, 308 (Ill. 1973) (“A complaint for negligence must set out: the
existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty
and an injury proximately resulting from the breach.”); Fisher v. Swift Transp.
Co., 181 P.3d 601, 606 (Mont. 2008) (“To maintain an action in negligence, the
plaintiff must prove four essential elements: duty, breach, causation, and damages.”).
9
See, e.g., PV Holding Co. v. Poe, 861 S.E.2d 265, 267 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021)
(“To prove causation in a negligence case, the plaintiff must show that the wrongdoing is both a cause in fact and a proximate cause of the injuries alleged.”); Ray
v. Swager, 903 N.W.2d 366, 371 (Mich. 2017) (“Proximate cause is distinct from
cause in fact, also known as factual causation . . . . Courts must not conflate these
two concepts.”); Tung v. Chi. Title Co., 278 Cal. Rptr. 3d 182, 189 (Cal. Ct. App.
2021) (“The causation analysis involved two elements. ‘One is cause in fact.’ . . .
The second element is proximate cause.” (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted));
Waste Mgmt., Inc. of Tenn. v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 15 S.W.3d 425, 430 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1997) (“Causation in fact and legal cause are very different concepts . . . and distinguishing between them has been hailed by some as one of the
most helpful of the recent breakthroughs in negligence jurisprudence.” (citations
omitted)); Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032, 1052 (La. 1991) (“[Proximate
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cause, actual causation, or cause-in-fact.10 It requires the plaintiff to
prove the chain of actual, physical causation extended from the defendant’s breaching behavior to the harm suffered by the plaintiff,
for which the plaintiff is seeking compensation from the defendant
by means of the negligence claim.11 In other words, the plaintiff establishes actual causation by showing that the defendant physically
caused the harm suffered by the plaintiff.12
This is typically accomplished by the plaintiff satisfying what is
known as the “but-for” test of actual causation.13 This test is satisfied
when the plaintiff can prove that but-for the defendant’s breaching
behavior (the behavior of the defendant used by the plaintiff to establish the second element of the prima facie case for negligence—
the breach element), the plaintiff would not have experienced the

cause] is not to be mistaken for cause-in-fact, as the two elements satisfy entirely
different functions in the negligence analysis.”).
10
Towe v. Sacagawea, Inc., 347 P.3d 766, 775 (Or. 2015) (“[T]he plaintiff in
a negligence action must also prove an actual cause link between the defendant’s
conduct and the plaintiff’s harm–that is, the plaintiff must prove ‘cause in fact.’”
(citations omitted)); Harper v. Rsrv. Life Ins. Co., 499 So. 2d 986, 987 (La. Ct.
App. 1986) (“It is well settled that an integral requirement of a tort claim is that
the alleged negligence was a cause in fact of the damage.” (citations omitted)).
11
Hetzel v. Parks, 971 P.2d 115, 120 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (“Cause in fact,
also known as actual causation, is the ‘but for’ consequence of an act. It connects
the act to the injury. It is a matter of what has in fact occurred.”); Snyder v. LTG
Lufttechnische GmbH, 955 S.W.2d 252, 256 n.6 (Tenn. 1997) (“Cause in fact
refers to the cause and effect relationship between the defendant’s tortious conduct and the plaintiff’s injury or loss.”).
12
City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 113 (Mo.
2007) (“In all tort cases, the plaintiff must prove that each defendant’s conduct
was an actual cause, also known as cause-in-fact, of the plaintiff’s injury . . . .”);
Drouhard-Nordhus v. Rosenquist, 345 P.3d 281, 286 (Kan. 2015) (“To establish
causation in fact, a plaintiff must prove a cause-and-effect relationship between a
defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s loss by presenting sufficient evidence from
which a jury can conclude that more likely than not, but for defendant’s conduct,
the plaintiff’s injuries would not have occurred.”).
13
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM §26 Reporters’ Note cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2010) (“Courts and scholars routinely acknowledge that the but-for test is central to determining factual cause.”).
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harm for which the plaintiff is seeking compensation from the defendant.14 Put slightly differently, the but-for test for actual causation is satisfied in circumstances in which hypothetical elimination
of the defendant’s breaching behavior would result in an absence of
harm experienced by the plaintiff.15 Only when the breaching behavior of the defendant was physically necessary in order for harm
to be experienced by the plaintiff is the actual cause prong of the
causation requirement satisfied.16
In addition to actual cause, a plaintiff bringing a negligence
claim must also establish what is conventionally known as proximate cause.17 Proximate cause in this context is established by
showing that a reasonable person in the position of the defendant, in
similar circumstances, would have foreseen that his or her breaching
behavior would result in the kind of harm experienced by the plaintiff.18 In other words, proximate cause is satisfied when the plaintiff
shows that under the specific circumstances of the case, the harm
suffered by the plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable given the unreasonably careless actions of the defendant.19

14

Deines v. Atlas Energy Servs., LLC, 484 P.3d 798, 801 (Colo. App. 2021)
(“To prove causation, the plaintiff must show, first, that, but for the alleged negligence, the harm would not have occurred.”).
15
Vincent v. Fairbanks Mem’l Hosp., 862 P.2d 847, 851 (Alaska 1993) (“The
‘but for’ test is the appropriate test for actual causation in the majority of circumstances. The ‘but for’ test has been described as follows: ‘The defendant’s conduct
is a cause of the event if the event would not have occurred . . . without it.’” (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 266
(5th ed. 1984))).
16
Wells v. Whitaker, 151 S.E.2d 422, 428 (Va. 1966) (“To impose liability
upon one person for damages incurred by another, it must be shown that the negligent conduct was a necessary physical antecedent of the damages.”).
17
Smith v. Herbin, 785 S.E.2d 743, 745 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016) (“Proximate
cause is an essential element of a negligence claim.” (citation omitted)).
18
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 3 cmt. g (AM. L. INST. 2010) (“To establish the actor’s negligence, it is
not enough that there be a likelihood of harm; the likelihood must be foreseeable
to the actor at the time of conduct.”).
19
See id. at § 3, Reporters’ Note cmt. g (“Determinations of negligence are
commonly based on findings as to which harms are foreseeable.”); Browning v.
Browning, 890 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Ark. 1995) (“We have made it clear in Arkansas
that the failure to guard against an occurrence that is not reasonable to anticipate
is not negligence.” (citations omitted)).
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At the first level of black letter doctrine, the existence of a causation element in the prima facie case of negligence requires the
plaintiff to establish that the unreasonably careless behavior of the
defendant both actually (physically) caused the harm for which the
plaintiff seeks compensation in the negligence action, and that such
harm was also a reasonably foreseeable consequence of that unreasonably careless behavior under the specific circumstances of the
case.20
II.

A NEGLIGENCE BASED COMPENSATION SYSTEM WITHOUT A
CAUSATION REQUIREMENT
While other social purposes are cited as being served by tort
law,21 there are two generally undisputed, dominant social purposes,
or policies, advanced by a properly functioning law of torts, including the negligence tort: (1) to provide an additional source of monetary compensation to injured individuals for recovery and rehabilitation (a compensation goal or policy); and (2) to discourage some
harm producing activities by imposing an involuntary and legally
enforced obligation on some harm producers to personally provide
that compensation to successful plaintiffs (a deterrence goal or policy).22 Large swaths of black letter tort doctrine have been rationalized by courts and commentators on the basis that tort law furthers
20
In re Walmart, Inc., 620 S.W.3d 851, 861 (Tex. App. 2021) (“Causation
includes two elements: cause in fact and foreseeability.”).
21
See generally John C. P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91
GEO. L.J. 513 (2003) (surveying dominant theoretical approaches to tort law in
the U.S. in the twentieth century); see also John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Thoroughly Modern Tort Theory, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 184, 186 (2021)
(“Tort law, on this view [a theory-skeptical social welfare approach], is a messy
business through which courts deliver some compensation, provide some deterrence, dispense some justice, and do some other stuff such that, if all goes well,
they will impose liability in a manner that contributes to social welfare, broadly
understood.”).
22
See Fu v. Fu, 733 A.2d 1133, 1141 (N.J. 1999) (“The interests underlying
the field of tort law require courts to consider the degree to which deterrence and
compensation, the fundamental goals to tort law, would be furthered by the application of a state’s local law.” (emphasis omitted)); Dickhoff ex rel. Dickhoff v.
Green, 836 N.W.2d 321, 347 (Minn. 2013) (“[T]he fundamental aims of tort law
includ[e] compensation for victims . . . and the deterrence of unsafe conduct . . . .”).
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a social policy of appropriate compensation, a social policy of appropriate deterrence, or both.23
So pervasive is the understanding that tort law is dominantly
about the business of advancing appropriate compensation and appropriate deterrence that it is easy to presume that every standard
element of well-established tort law claims, like negligence, have
been crafted over time, and are fundamentally rationalized, on this
basis.24
Part of what makes causation in tort law such a persistently difficult and vexing requirement—to understand, rationalize, and implement—is that it does not conform to this otherwise pervasive attribute of the law of torts.25 The presence of a causation requirement
in negligence cannot be satisfactorily understood or adequately explained by reference to the way in which it advances either a compensation objective or a deterrence objective.26 In fact, it can be persuasively argued that the presence of a causation requirement in the
prima facie case for negligence actually operates to retard the potential for the claim to more robustly advance both compensation and
deterrence.27

23

See Stephen D. Sugarman, A Restatement of Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1163,
1167 (1992) (noting that the American Law Institute Study preceding the Restatement (Third) of Torts evaluates existing tort law and its alternatives primarily in
terms of: “(1) how well they channel human behavior in socially desirable ways,
and (2) how well they provide accident victims appropriate compensation.”).
24
Greenwalt v. Ram Rest. Corp. of Wyo., 71 P.3d 717, 723–24 (Wyo. 2003)
(“As a leading authority of tort law instructs, ‘[t]he most commonly mentioned
aims of tort law are (1) compensation of injured persons and (2) deterrence of
undesirable behavior.” (quoting DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 12 (2000)));
Simon v. Philip Morris Inc., 200 F.R.D. 21, 46 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting “tort law
system’s twin aims of compensating those injured by others and deterring tortfeasors by requiring them to pay for the harm they cause.”).
25
See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 228 (1987).
26
Much law & economics analysis of negligence, focused as it is on the maximizing of collective benefits from an overall societal perspective, has had difficulty rationalizing the causation requirement, and some commentators working
from a law & economics perspective have suggested that it be eliminated. See,
e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 25, at 229 (“[T]he idea of causation can
largely be dispensed with in an economic analysis of torts . . . .”).
27
See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 21, at 191.
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Imagine, for example, a social system based on negligence that
does not include any causation requirement.28 Such a system might
offer injured individuals monetary payments calculated to compensate them for certain recognized injuries so long as these claimants
could produce adequate proof of their own lack, or relative lack, of
culpability in the infliction of the harm for which they are seeking
compensation, and also adequate proof of the unreasonably careless
behavior of another person in the relevant jurisdiction during a specified period. In such a system, the prima facie application for the
receipt of compensation might be: (1) proof of the suffering by the
applicant/plaintiff of harm of the right sort (not loss of economic
advantage only, not modest and purely emotional distress, not familial or spiritual injury, etc., just like existing tort law); (2) proof
that the applicant/plaintiff was not more than a specified percentage
personally responsible for the infliction of that injury (similar to
contributory negligence and partial comparative negligence systems), or imposition of a reduction in the compensation awarded
based on the applicant’s own culpability in the infliction of the harm
(similar to pure comparative negligence); and (3) proof that a specified individual (the defendant) acted in an unreasonably careless
manner with respect to the kind of harms recognized by the system
during some specified period.
Such a system could assess a fine and thus impose legal liability
against those defendants who were shown by plaintiffs to have acted
unreasonably carelessly; much as modern criminal law systems routinely assess monetary fines against defendants shown to have acted
in a proscribed manner irrespective of whether the proscribed behavior in fact resulted in actual harm.29 These fines would serve as
the basic source of funding for the compensatory payments made by
the system to successful applicants.
For instance, if a given jurisdiction decided to segregate all, or
part, of the money that it collected during a given period as a result
28

Jules Coleman imagines a similar system. See generally Jules L. Coleman,
Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349 (1992).
29
Luz Lazo, Speed-Camera Tickets Made $62 Million for Maryland Last
Year, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2018, 7:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/dr-gridlock/wp/2018/02/06/speed-camera-tickets-made-62million-for-maryland-last-year/ (“Maryland jurisdictions issued more than 1.5
million tickets for speed-camera violations last fiscal year . . . which generated
$62.2 million in revenue . . . .”).
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of its passive enforcement of traffic laws (speed and red light cameras, for example) and made that money available as compensation
exclusively to those injured on the roads of that same jurisdiction
during that same period, such a system would operate in a similar
fashion to the one suggested, substituting the state in place of the
injured individual as the party establishing the liability of defendants.30
Such a hypothetical system would further the compensation goal
of tort law by offering appropriate resources to injured individuals
and would further the deterrence goal by imposing liability on those
who have been shown to have acted with unreasonable carelessness,
all without any recourse to a requirement that there be any causative
link between the specific plaintiff’s harm and the unreasonably careless behavior of the defendant.
In fact, such a system would very likely be a more powerful provider of compensation and a more robust generator of deterrence
than the traditional negligence tort. Why?
This system would offer compensation to plaintiffs who were
injured by ways and means that did not involve any unreasonably
careless behavior by another, and also to plaintiffs who were injured
by unreasonably careless persons who are not as a practical matter
effectively responsive to negligence liability, such as defendants
without assets or insurance.31 These are two classes of innocently

30
Dedication of revenue raised in a specific way toward identified uses is
common among the states, as is reluctance of state legislatures to make good on
such promises. See, e.g., Texas Lawmakers Sit on Red-Light Revenue Dedicated
to Trauma Centers, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Jan. 7, 2012, 8:58 PM), http://dallasnews.com/news/texas/2012/01/08/texas-lawmakers-sit-on-red-light-revenuededicated-to-trauma-centers/; Kevin P. Brady & John C. Pijanowski, Maximizing
State Lottery Dollars for Public Education: An Analysis of Current State Lottery
Models, 7 J. EDUC. RSCH & POL’Y STUD. 20, 20 (2007) (“State sponsored lotteries
are an increasingly popular, non-traditional revenue stream for public education.
There is in many cases, however, a gap between their promoted benefit to public
K-12 schools and the actual fiscal support they provide.”).
31
Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 407,
408 (1987) (“From the standpoint of the injured party, it matters little whether the
harm was negligently caused. The inquiry into the culpability of the injurer diverts
attention from the palpable loss that has been inflicted. The occurrence of injury,
so it might be thought, makes the differentiation between its negligent and its innocent cause . . . a fortuity . . . .”).
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injured individuals who are currently excluded from the compensatory benefits of negligence, and who may represent a large number—both absolutely and relatively—of all injured persons in a jurisdiction.32
Such a system would generate a far more robust deterrence to
engage in unreasonably careless behavior than does negligence because the deterrent effect of such a system would potentially extend
to all persons within its jurisdiction who engage in unreasonably
careless behavior, not just those persons whose unreasonably careless behavior actually resulted in tangible harm to another.33 Like
those injured in the absence of someone else’s unreasonable carelessness, those who engage in unreasonably careless behavior in a
specific circumstance and do not cause harm to another as a result,
may represent a large number—both absolutely and relatively—of
all persons in a jurisdiction who engage in unreasonably careless
behavior.34
Note that both the compensatory and the deterrence features of
this imagined system are not novel.35 Many compensation systems
that respond to injured or otherwise ailing individuals, like medical
care insurance and workers compensation, offer compensatory benefits to such individuals without regard to the specific mechanism or

32
See, e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 603, 605–06 (2006); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE
L.J. 1, 4 (1996); Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 45, 45 (1986).
33
Strong law-and-economics analysis of tort law has had difficulty rationalizing the existence of the causation requirement in tort law generally, and in the
negligence tort in particular. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
ACCIDENT LAW 113 (1987); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY
FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 Reporters’ Note cmt. e (AM. L. INST.
2010) (“For negligence-based torts, scope-of-liability limitations are difficult to
justify from a pure deterrence standpoint. Once a determination of negligence is
made, the defendant’s behavior has already been found to pose excessive risks,
and imposing liability, regardless of the connection to the harm, can only improve
deterrence.”).
34
See Gilles, supra note 32, at 605–06.
35
See Donald G. Gifford, The Death of Causation: Mass Products Torts’ Incomplete Incorporation of Social Welfare Principles, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
943, 950 (2006).
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cause of the harm.36 Criminal law has long included the so-called
inchoate crimes: behavior that does not result in actual injury to another but that, nevertheless, triggers criminal liability.37 In fact, the
modern development of passive traffic enforcement mechanisms,
and the many millions of dollars in criminal fines that they generate,
represent an explosive growth in the societal deterrence of unreasonably careless behavior that does not result in any actual injury.38
A social system could feasibly be designed to achieve the attractive benefits of compensation and deterrence provided by negligence without including any requirement that the unreasonably careless behavior of the defendant be shown to have, in any way, been
the cause of the plaintiff’s harm.39 Such a system would far more
powerfully generate and achieve both compensation and deterrence
than does our current negligence tort system.40 This means that not
only can the presence of a causation requirement in negligence not
be properly understood and rationalized by means of its contribution
to compensation and deterrence, but that the presence of a causation
requirement in negligence should also be understood to be at the expense of greater compensation and deterrence. In other words, the
causation requirement comes at a cost, namely, the cost of negligence pursuing its two dominant social purposes—compensation
and deterrence—less effectively.41
Id. (“Unlike traditional tort law, the principles governing workers’ compensation do not require the claimant to prove causation in any meaningful
sense.”).
37
Douglas N. Husak, The Nature and Justifiability of Nonconsummate Offenses, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 151, 161 n.47 (1995).
38
Peter Jamison, Speed Camera Tickets Doubled Last Year in D.C., New
Data Show, WASH. POST (July 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/speed-camera-tickets-doubled-last-year-in-dc-new-datashow/2017/07/19/6e67dda2-6cbd-11e7-b9e2-2056e768a7e5_story.html (“The
District issued almost a million speed-camera tickets last year . . . which led to
$99.2 million in revenue for the city. . . . There were nearly 2.2 million speedcamera tickets issued [in 2016] in the D.C. Metro area, up from 1.8 million in
2015.”); Andy Medici, District Sees Soaring Revenue from Speed Cameras,
WASH. BUS. J. (Dec. 4, 2017), www.bizjournals.com/washington/news/2017/12/04/district-sees-soaring-revenue-from-speed-cameras-a.html
(“More than $100 million in revenue came from 10 speed cameras alone . . . .”).
39
See Shavell, supra note 32, at 107–09.
40
See id. at 107–10.
41
See id.
36
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III.

THE UNDERLYING PURPOSE OF A CAUSATION REQUIREMENT
IN NEGLIGENCE
If the presence of a causation requirement in negligence cannot
be accurately understood by recourse to its contribution to either
compensation or deterrence, and if in fact the existence of a causation requirement meaningfully limits the compensation and deterrence that is achieved by the negligence tort, then what might satisfactorily explain its existence? Putting aside the more descriptive
possibilities of legal custom, specific common law history, and path
dependence, what might account, normatively, for the continued
presence of a causation requirement in negligence and to some extent its existence more generally in the law of tort? What value or
values are advanced by a causation requirement that justifies the
burden it imposes on the dominant goals of compensation and deterrence?
I suggest the answer to these questions is that the presence of a
causation requirement in negligence, and to a large extent more generally in tort law, is necessary in order to ensure the existence of a
certain, specific kind of fault by the defendant in every instance in
which negligence liability is imposed.42 The causation requirement
functions to ensure that the liability generated by the negligence
claim is confined to those defendants who are what I will call “genuinely socially responsible” for the plaintiff’s harm.43 Thus, the inclusion of a causation requirement will result in the negligence tort
imposing legal liability for the forced compensation of a victim only
on those defendants who are found to be at fault for the plaintiff’s
harm in all of three distinct ways: (1) the defendant is at fault for
having engaged in unreasonably careless behavior; (2) the defendant
See Coleman, supra note 28, at 351 (“Fault is central both to the institution
of tort law and, in my view, to its ultimate moral defensibility.”).
43
This claim, while not necessarily a part of the corrective justice account of
tort law, is at least consistent with it. See Jules L. Coleman, The Structure of Tort
Law, 97 YALE L.J. 1233, 1249 (1988) (“To the extent tort law is a forum for vindicating claims to repair, the victim’s connection to his injurer is fundamental and
analytic, not tenuous or contingent. That his injurer acted towards him in a way
that gives rise to a legitimate claim in justice to compensation is the heart of the
victim’s assertion.”); see also id. at 1251 (“[I]n torts a victim seeks to show that
the loss he has suffered is a wrongful one, one which requires recompense as a
matter of right, not utility. And central to that claim is showing that the loss results
from the mischief of the defendant.”).
42
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is at fault for having actually caused the plaintiff’s harm as a result
of that unreasonably careless behavior; and (3) the defendant is at
fault for being genuinely socially responsible—for being morally
blameworthy—for the harm suffered by the plaintiff.44 These three
kinds of fault are not the same, and the social consequences of conditioning negligence liability on some without the others are potentially profound.45

44

See Coleman, supra note 28, at 350–51.
Recognition that fault is an integral attribute of negligence is hardly new.
However, discussion of the fault requirement in negligence typically focuses on
the duty and breach elements of the prima facie case, where it is most manifest.
See Coleman v. LA Terre Physical Therapy, Inc., 36 So.3d 325, 328 (La. Ct. App.
2010) (“Fault is determined by a legal duty to guard against a certain risk and
breach of that duty . . . .”); Coste v. Riverside Motors, Inc., 585 A.2d 1263, 1265
(Conn. App. Ct. 1991) (“The elements of duty and breach require that a defendant’s conduct constitutes fault in the performance of a duty owed to a plaintiff.”);
Heidi Li Feldman, Blending Fields: Tort Law, Philosophy, and Legal Theory, 49
S.C. L. REV. 167, 172 (1997) (“Traditionally, the general duty of care constitutes
the liability standard in a tort’s negligence regime . . . . If we breach this duty,
then we are at fault and may owe damages to those injured because of our
breach.”); Michael Koty Newman, The Elephant Not in the Room: Apportionment
to Nonparties in Georgia, 50 GA. L. REV. 669, 696 (2016) (“Since there was absolutely no evidence presented establishing a breach of duty on the part of the
[defendants], fault could not rationally be apportioned to them . . . .”). Far less
common is the recognition that the causation requirement of negligence is not just
about, but all about, ensuring that all defendants held liable for negligence are to
blame in a particular and specific way for the plaintiff’s harm. See id. at 674, 681.
Much of the published analysis of the causation requirement, and especially its various exceptions, talk in terms of the existence of the requirement, and
the need to craft various exceptions to its basic tests, being a matter of common
sense, or being in conformance with conventional intuition. See John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REV.
1123, 1125–33 (2007). Almost always, this is meant to refer to common sense or
conventional intuition regarding what was or was not a physical cause of a given
injury. See id. Rarely is it recognized that the black-letter tests for the requirement,
and the need to create certain exceptions to them, are driven less by an underlying
interest in physical causation per se than by a concern for employing such tests,
and then needing such exceptions, to most accurately identify the presence of genuine social responsibility by the defendant. See id. The causation requirement in
negligence is a surrogate measure for the existence of genuine social responsibility. See id. A full understanding of the causation requirement, and the most effective design of its tests and exceptions, is contingent upon recognition that the only
real purpose of the requirement in the negligence tort—the only important social
policy advanced by its existence and operation—is the limiting of the imposition
45
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Consider a typical, casual playground pick-up basketball game.
Anyone having much experience with this activity knows the standard of play with regard to the calling of rule violations is “no harm,
no foul.”46 That is, no rule violation is to be called unless, at a minimum, the violation had a meaningful negative effect on the other
team.47 If it did not make a significant difference, then it is to be
ignored and forgotten, and play should proceed uninterrupted.48
The policy underlying such a standard in this activity is fairly
straight-forward: the primary purpose of the activity is the pleasure
of the play itself, including its competitive aspect.49 The participants
are there to play ball—not to engage in a test of rule knowledge and
compliance. If an otherwise clear and unambiguous rule violation
does not seriously impair the pleasure or the competitive fairness of

of liability generated by the tort to only those individuals who are at social and
moral fault for the plaintiff’s harm. See id.
46
Daniels v. Aldridge Pite Haan, LLP, No. 5:20-cv-00089-TES, 2020 WL
3866649, at *1 (M.D. Ga. July 8, 2020) (“‘No harm. No foul.’ For years, players
in pickup basketball games all over playgrounds, church gyms, and driveway
courts have followed this simple phrase. Although one team may have technically
violated a rule, the other team wasn’t hurt or put at a disadvantage, so the refs (or
more likely, the players themselves) just let it go as there was no need to slow
down the game with silly, hypertechnical, ticky-tack fouls.”); Aquidneck Ave.
Assocs. v. Aquidneck Court Assocs. (In re DiMartino), 108 B.R. 394, 403 (D.R.I.
1989) (“The no-harm-no-foul rule of the basketball court should be applied in this
law court.”); Nabors Drilling USA v. Davis, 857 So. 2d 407, 416 n.4 (La. 2003)
(“Essentially, the legislature adopted the playground basketball adage: ‘no harm,
no foul.’”).
47
Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Singh, 212 A.3d 888, 891 (Md. 2019)
(“The phrase ‘no harm, no foul’ derives from the idea that, if a foul committed in
a basketball game does not affect the outcome, the referee should not call the
foul.”); Snider v. Danfoss, LLC, No. 15 CV 4748, 2017 WL 2973464, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. July 12, 2017) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) incorporates the longstanding legal principle embodied in the phrase used on basketball courts everyday across the country: ‘No harm; no foul.’”).
48
See The Proverbial Game: ‘The Dictionary of Modern Proverbs’ Uncovers
the Origins of Sporting Terms, YALE BOOKS BLOG (June 8, 2012),
https://yalebooksblog.co.uk/2012/06/08/the-proverbial-game-the-dictionary-ofmodern-proverbs-uncovers-the-origins-of-sporting-terms/.
49
See Ryan Wood, Take Your Skills to the Street, USA BASKETBALL (Mar.
21, 2011), https://www.usab.com/youth/news/2011/03/take-your-skills-to-thestreet.aspx.
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the ongoing game, then, while no less a violation of the rules, it is
not to be enforced.50 No harm, no foul.
Within such a regulatory framework, there can be said to be two
kinds, or levels, of faulty behavior by players. One kind of fault is
the violation of an established rule.51 Thus, a player on offense who
stands in the lane for more than three seconds consecutively is at
fault for violating a rule of the game.52 This behavior is, within the
context of the game, more blameworthy, and thus the violator is
more at fault, than a player who fully conforms to the rules. This
kind of fault can be called “behavioral fault.”53 It is, without more,
a violation but no harm.54
This kind of fault is importantly different, however, especially
in the context of a pick-up game, from the kind of fault that attaches
to a player who stands in the lane close to the basket for more than
three seconds consecutively and then receives a pass, turns, and
makes a short shot for a score. This kind of second-level fault can
be called “consequential fault.”55 It is a violation resulting in competitive harm, and it therefore represents a fair opportunity for calling a rule violation during the pick-up game under the no harm, no
foul principle.56
Without a causation requirement, the negligence tort would still
require behavioral fault of liable defendants.57 It does this through
the breach element of the prima facie case.58 One of the purposes of
50

See No Harm No Foul, GRAMMARIST, http://grammarist.com/phrase/noharm-no-foul/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2022).
51
See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
52
More specifically, a basketball “player shall not remain in the opponents’
restricted area for more than three consecutive seconds while his team is in control
of a live ball in the frontcourt and the game clock is running.” 2020 Official Basketball Rules: Basketball Rules, INT’L BASKETBALL FED’N 31 (Oct. 1, 2020),
http://fiba.basketball/documents/official-basketball-rules/2020.pdf [hereinafter
2020 Official Basketball Rules].
53
See Coleman, supra note 28, at 351, 370.
54
See id.
55
See 2020 Official Basketball Rules, supra note 52, at 41.
56
See id.
57
Marc S. Stauch, Causation Issues in Medical Malpractice: A United Kingdom Perspective, 5 ANNALS OF HEALTH L. 247, 249 (1996) (“This element, the
need to show causation, constitutes the link between the defendant’s fault—the
breach of duty—and the harm suffered by the plaintiff.”).
58
Grigsby v. Coastal Marine Serv. of Tex., Inc., 235 F. Supp. 97, 108 (W.D.
La. 1964) (“A review of the Louisiana jurisprudence convinces this Court that
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the causation requirement in negligence is the addition of a consequential fault requirement to a behavioral fault requirement.59 In this
way, negligence embraces the same no harm, no foul principle as
the pick-up basketball game.60
In contrast to the no harm, no foul commitment of tort law, criminal law will impose formal liability on persons who possess only
behavioral fault and not consequential fault.61 Inchoate crimes like
the various versions of conspiracy, attempt, and solicitation threaten
potentially severe criminal sanctions in response to behavior that is
deemed antisocial, but that has not in fact resulted in any actual
harm.62
Why might tort law adopt such a strikingly different posture than
does criminal law with respect to the matter of imposing formal liability in response to only behavioral fault? Why does tort law adhere
so closely to a no harm, no foul principle of liability when criminal
law so clearly, and so increasingly, does not?

‘fault’ . . . may be succinctly defined as a breach of duty or a want of that degree
of care required in a given case.”); Reed v. Weber, No. 2014-CA-002030-MR,
2016 WL 3661909, at *1 (Ky. Ct. App. July 1, 2016) (“For fault to be placed on
either party, a party must have breached his duty . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Marc
S. Firestone, Problems in the Resolution of Disputes Concerning Damage Caused
in Outer Space, 59 TUL. L. REV. 747, 768 (1985) (“Since the industrial revolution,
common-law theories of fault-based liability have changed, but one notion has
remained constant: fault-based liability does not exist in the absence of some
breach of duty on the part of the defendant.”).
59
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
60
Malave-Felix v. Volvo Car Corp., 946 F.2d 967, 971 (1st Cir. 1991) (“A
person can act negligently . . . and yet escape liability if his negligent act fortuitously does not cause injury to another.”).
61
United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir. 2008) (“In tort law,
unsuccessful attempts do not give rise to liability . . . . The criminal law . . . takes
a different approach. A person who demonstrates by his conduct that he has the
intention and capability of committing a crime is punishable even if his plan was
thwarted.”).
62
See Herbert Wechsler et al., The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the
Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy (pts. 1 & 2), 61 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 571–72, 575–76, 957 (1961); Ira P.
Robbins, Double Inchoate Crimes, 26 HARV. J. LEGIS. 1, 1 (1989) (“American
criminal law treats the inchoate crimes of attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation as
substantive offenses punishable by criminal sanctions. The legal system criminalizes the types of behavior that constitute these offenses to intervene before an
actor completes the intended illegal act.”).
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One approach to these questions is to consider in more detail the
nature of life in a community in which a negligence-based compensation system without a causation requirement of the sort imagined
above has been established and is in operation. Persons who have
experienced harm not due to their own fault under such a regime
would create a significant demand for evidence of unreasonably
careless conduct by another of the sort that would qualify them for
compensatory benefits.63 It would likely not take long before a cottage industry developed that would satisfy this demand.64 In this
way, an extensive network of private surveillance and evidence collection would begin to permeate the affected community.65 Private
citizens, either directly or through organized third-parties, would
have a strong incentive to aggressively monitor the observable behavior of their fellow citizens for admissible evidence of unreasonably careless behavior.66
Is such a scenario entirely speculative and imagined? Hardly.67
63

See infra notes 64–67 and accompanying text.
Such business opportunities have developed in areas where the law has
created incentives for private citizens to pursue fellow private citizens concerning
legal matters on behalf of the government. Rebecca B. Fisher, The History of
American Bounty Hunting as a Study in Stunted Legal Growth, 33 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 199, 200–04 (2009) (describing that bounty hunting by private
citizens is common in the United States and has been part of the American criminal justice landscape since the eighteenth century).
65
Emily Michael Stout, Bounty Hunters as Evidence Gatherers: Should They
Be Considered State Actors Under the Fourth Amendment When Working with
the Police?, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 665, 666 (1997) (“As the number of people arrested continues to grow, bounty hunting has become a growth industry in the
United States.”).
66
One area of law in which there is a long history of private, for-profit, organized third-party surveillance and evidence gathering against individuals in pursuit of an economic advantage in a legal action is divorce. See Kitty Hailey, Private Investigators in Divorce Cases: An Investigator’s Viewpoint, 12 DIVORCE
LITIG. 38, 38 (2000) (“The role of a trained and licensed private investigator as a
nonpartial, objective gatherer of evidence is immensely valuable in the field of
divorce litigation.”).
67
Choe Sang-Hun, Help Wanted: Busybodies with Cameras, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 28, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/29/world/asia/in-south-korea-where-digital-tattling-is-a-growth-industry.html. In South Korea, the government in recent years has established various programs that offer private citizens
financial bounties for providing to the government evidence of the commission of
mainly minor crimes by their fellow citizens, “some as minor as a motorist tossing
a cigarette butt out the window.” Id. As a result, “snitching for pay has become
64
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Under the negligence-based compensation system considered
above, this citizen-on-citizen monitoring and surveillance activity
would be motivated by the prospect of the receipt of compensatory
benefits—a sometimes substantial financial incentive.68 In addition,
each instance of successful evidence collection and submission
would result in the imposition of legal liability, sometimes substantial, on the actor so ensnared.69

especially popular” and resulted in large numbers of South Koreans who, encouraged by news reports of individuals who earn tens of thousands of dollars a year
reporting crimes, “roam cities secretly videotaping fellow citizens breaking the
law, deliver the evidence to government officials and collect the rewards.” Id.
Reportedly, “the phenomenon is large enough that it has spawned a new industry:
schools set up to train aspiring paparazzi [as these bounty hunters are typically
called].” Id.
Only imaginable in countries outside of the United States? Again, hardly.
See Michael Wilson, $87.50 for 3 Minutes: Inside the Hot Market for Videos of
Idling Trucks, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2022) https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/19/nyregion/clean-air-idle-car.html (reporting on New York
City’s “Citizens Air Complaint Program, a public health campaign that invites —
and pays — people to report trucks that are parked and idling for more than three
minutes, one minute if outside a school. Those who report collect 25 percent of
any fine against a truck by submitting a video just over 3 minutes in length that
shows the engine is running and the name of the company on the door. The program has vastly increased the number of complaints of idling trucks sent to the
city, from just a handful before its creation in 2018 to more than 12,000 last
year.”).
68
The impulse of some individuals to engage in private surveillance and evidence gathering against fellow citizens does not always require a prospective financial incentive to be activated. Monica R. Shah, The Case for a Statutory Suppression Remedy to Regulate Illegal Private Party Searches in Cyberspace, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 250, 250 (2005) (“In a recent bout of vigilantism, private parties
have independently pursued investigations of suspected criminals through
searches on the internet . . . . In several cases, courts have admitted the fruits of
intrusive, and probably illegal, private party searches of computers belonging to
suspected criminals.”).
69
See Fisher, supra note 64, at 204–05 n.38 (“[T]he common law is clear that
a surety on a bail bond, or his appointed deputy, may take his principal into custody wherever he may be found, without process, in order to delivery him the
proper authority so that the surety may avoid liability on the bond. So long as the
bounds of reasonable means needed to effect the apprehension are not transgressed, and the purpose of the recapture is proper in the light of the surety’s undertaking, sureties will not be liable . . . .” (citations omitted)).
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Given these likely consequences, it could be argued that tort law
has embraced, and continues to embrace, a no harm, no foul principle of liability out of concern that normal life in the absence of such
a limitation on civil liability would become intolerable.70 Much like
the pick-up basketball game, the primary goal is to live (to play), not
to enforce the rules and norms of communal life (the game). Monitoring and enforcement of behavioral rules and standards should
serve the purposes of enhancing the quality of life in the relevant
community; the quality of life should not suffer in service to more
aggressive and thorough monitoring and enforcement of those rules
and standards.71
If this analysis is sound, then why would criminal law not join
tort law in embracing and internalizing a no harm, no foul principle
of liability? Recently, one might argue that the development of relatively inexpensive systems of enforcement, like passive speed and
red light cameras, have introduced a powerful revenue motive for
governments to pursue criminal liability in response to citizen behavior that demonstrates behavioral fault, but not consequential
fault.72 However, the existence of inchoate crimes, such as conspiracy, attempt, and solicitation, long predate the modern era of highly
profitable enforcement of undesirable behavior that in fact causes
no concrete harm.73
One possible answer to the existence of these contrasting approaches lies in the difference between the plaintiffs—the moving
70
Steven A. Glazer, Those Speed Cameras are Everywhere: Automated
Speed Monitoring Law, Enforcement, and Physics in Maryland, 7 J. BUS. & TECH.
L. 1, 2 (2012) (“[S]peed camera violations now clog the district courts of Maryland and normally prudent and reasonable drivers feel preyed upon by the ubiquitous traps.”).
71
See id.
72
See Jamison, supra note 38; Medici, supra note 38; see also Joel O. Christensen, Wrong on Red: The Constitutional Case Against Red-Light Cameras, 32
WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 443, 443 (2010) (“Though the marriage of surveillance
technology and law enforcement hardly is a new phenomenon, the twentieth-century has proven to be a brave new world in this realm.”).
73
See generally Jerome Hall, Criminal Attempt–A Study of Foundations of
Criminal Liability, 49 YALE L. J. 789, 790–812 (1940) (discussing the history of
inchoate crimes, especially attempt); Francis B. Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35
HARV. L. REV. 393 (1922) (discussing the history of conspiracy laws); JOHN F.
DECKER, PROSTITUTION: REGULATION AND CONTROL 82–83 n.6–39 (1979) (collecting sources discussing the history of solicitation laws).
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parties seeking liability—in the two systems.74 In tort law, the plaintiff is overwhelmingly a private citizen who is pursuing a tort claim
that will potentially generate a personal monetary benefit for that
individual.75 When considering the prospect of seeking tort liability
against possible defendants, such an injured individual is not required, and is generally not expected, to take into account larger societal interests and values, such as whether greater overall deterrence for behavior like the defendant’s is at the present time societally beneficial, or whether the likely amount of eventual liability
imposed on the defendant is reasonably and fairly proportionate to
the larger societal culpability of that behavior.76 A given plaintiff’s
analysis of whether to bring a tort claim, what specific tort claim to
bring, and how aggressively to pursue the claim will almost always
be economic and individual in nature.77
In contrast, the criminal law system has a structural element of
public prosecutorial discretion.78 Overwhelmingly, actual criminal
prosecution of behaviorally blameworthy conduct does not commence, or continue, until a public official has reviewed the matter
and made an affirmative decision that criminal prosecution is in the
best interests of the community.79 Moreover, enforcement activity
in the realm of criminal law typically involves significant triage,

74

Coleman, supra note 43, at 1249.
See id.
76
See Weinrib, supra note 31, at 408 (“From the standpoint of the injured
party, it matters little whether the harm was negligently caused [or pursuing a
negligence action serves a social function].”).
77
See Shavell, supra note 32, at 113.
78
Rebecca Krauss, Note, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal
Law: Origins and Development, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 2 (2009) (“Prosecutorial discretion is a central component of the federal criminal justice system.”);
Peter L. Markowitz, Prosecutorial Discretion Power at Its Zenith: The Power to
Protect Liberty, 97 B.U. L. REV. 489, 490 (2017) (“Prosecutorial discretion is
most commonly conceived of in the criminal context, wherein prosecutors routinely make determinations about which cases to bring, how vigorously to pursue
them, and if and when to abandon a prosecution.”).
79
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.9(c) (3d ed. 2007)
(“There is universal agreement in the modern commentary as to the central role
of discretionary authority in the administration of the criminal justice process.”);
Nancy C. McCurley, Prosecutorial Discretion, 71 GEO. L. J. 449, 449 (1982)
(“The prosecutor has broad authority to decide what charges to bring, when to
bring them, and whether to prosecute.”).
75
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whereby limited enforcement resources are allocated on the basis of
perceived larger societal interests.80
It is the near omnipresence in the criminal law system of processes by which both enforcement and prosecution resources and
activities are deployed on the basis of larger societal interests that
makes tolerable the presence of criminal law liability in response to
behavior that is antisocial but does not in fact cause harm.81 Tort
law, lacking any such mechanism or filter, has developed its doctrine in a way that excludes civil liability for such behavior.
How does the analysis thus far help in determining the social
purpose underlying the causation requirement in negligence?
It allows us to say with some meaning that the causation requirement in negligence exists to ensure that all defendants who are held
liable for negligence possessed not just behavioral fault under the
circumstances, but also possessed more specific consequential fault
for the harm suffered by the plaintiff.82 In order to be liable for negligence when negligence requires causation, the defendant must at
least have acted in a faulty manner (satisfying the breach element)
and that breaching behavior must have resulted in actual harm to the
plaintiff (satisfying the actual cause requirement).83 The defendant
must have been, in a sense, at least doubly at fault, not just at firstlevel behavioral fault.84 In other words, the causation requirement
includes in the basic design of the negligence tort a no harm, no foul
principle, much like the pick-up basketball game.85

80

F. Andrew Hessick & Carissa Byrne Hessick, Nondelegation and Criminal
Law, 107 VA. L. REV. 281, 330–31 (2021) (“Prosecutors must make decisions
about which cases to pursue based on the strength of available evidence. They
also must make choices because they do not have enough resources to enforce the
law every time it is violated. These resource constraints may lead law enforcement
to prioritize one type of crime over another.”).
81
See id.
82
See Coleman, supra note 28, at 370.
83
See Houston v. Frog’s Rest., LLC, 513 F. Supp. 3d 235, 242 (D.P.R. 2021)
(“Once a plaintiff has demonstrated that the defendant was negligent (breached
the duty of care), he or she must then demonstrate that the defendant’s negligence
actually caused her injuries . . . .”).
84
See id.
85
See Daniels v. Aldridge Pite Haan, No. 5:20-cv-0089-TES, 2020 WL
3866649, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Jul. 8, 2020).
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Causation in negligence does more, however.86 The causation
requirement not only limits legal liability to those defendants who
both fouled and harmed, it further limits liability to only those defendants who are thought to be genuinely socially responsible—
morally and socially to blame—for the plaintiff being burdened with
the harm for which he or she seeks forced compensation by way of
the negligence tort.87
Requiring genuine social responsibility is not necessary for the
feasible operation of a negligence-based compensation system, no
more than is requiring causation at all.88 It is a normative choice, a
value judgment. It is the consequence of a decision not to impose
the power of the state to force an involuntary transfer of assets from
one individual to another through the civil action of negligence unless the target of that power, the defendant, is found to have been
genuinely socially responsible for the recipient’s, the plaintiff’s,
harm.89 It is the consequence of a larger social judgment to apply a
notion of just deserts to the formal imposition of negligence liability.90
Whether or not such a requirement ever was warranted, and
whether it still is, can be the subject of legitimate and rich debate.91
My claim here is not that negligence must include such a requirement or that society and the individuals within it are better off when
negligence does include such a requirement. Instead, my claim is
86

See Coleman, supra note 28, at 370.
See id.
88
See supra notes 28–36 and accompanying text.
89
Jules L. Coleman, Mistakes, Misunderstandings, and Misalignments, 121
YALE L.J. ONLINE 541, 549–50 (2012) (“From the normative point of view, the
successful tort suit renders the defendant vulnerable to the plaintiff’s power to
impose an evil upon him. . . . This means that the elements of the tort [of negligence] align insofar as, taken together, they warrant the conferral of a power to
impose an evil (a liability) on the defendant.”).
90
See United States v. Vue, 865 F. Supp. 1353, 1360 (D. Neb. 1994) (“[T]he
[United States Sentencing Commission] Guidelines attempt to implement the
principle of ‘just deserts’; that is, punishment should be scaled to the offender’s
culpability and the resulting harm.”).
91
This debate, in more recent times, has been most productively and notoriously between law and economic and corrective justice theorists. See generally
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (1970); SHAVELL, supra note 33; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 25;
COLEMAN, supra note 4; ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF A PRIVATE LAW (1995);
ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW (1999).
87
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that the existence of the causation requirement that in fact exists in
negligence (and to some extent more generally in tort law) is best
explained and understood as serving the purpose of requiring of all
liable defendants genuine social responsibility for the plaintiff’s
harm.92 In other words, causation, as that doctrine is currently configured, exists in negligence in order to restrict liability generated
by that tort to only those defendants who are properly thought to be
blamed for the plaintiff’s injury, who are genuinely and fully responsible for it.93
One test for the likely validity of this claim is the degree to which
it explains and gives useful meaning to long-standing, and still current, causation doctrine.94 To what extent does the law of causation
in negligence conform to the purposes of advancing this underlying
social value? To the extent that the claim appears valid, it then offers
a useful and powerful way to understand, to rationalize, and to implement causation doctrine moving forward.95
IV.

THE WAYS IN WHICH CAUSATION DOCTRINE CONFORMS TO
AN UNDERLYING POLICY OF LIMITING NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY TO
THOSE DEFENDANTS WHO ARE GENUINELY SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE PLAINTIFF’S HARM
From the perspective of pursuing the goal of restricting negligence liability to only those genuinely socially at fault for the plaintiff’s harm—to those who are appropriately morally blameworthy—
the design of causation doctrine can be seen as akin to an attempt to
hit and to completely cover a specified target, like the old boardwalk
arcade booths at which a patron tries to completely shoot out a star

COLEMAN, supra note 4, at 381 (“[The tort victim’s] claim is valid only if
(in most cases) he can show that his loss is the result of the injurer’s fault or is
otherwise the injurer’s responsibility. The victim brings an action against his injurer because his (the victim’s) claim to compensation as a matter of justice is
based on his claims about what the injurer did to him . . . .”).
93
Id. at 374 (“[T]he [tort] victim is usually required to show that the person
he seeks to have held liable to him is responsible in the relevant way for his loss.
Therefore, in a typical tort suit in which the victim has a legitimate claim to repair
in justice, her loss is imposed on the individual responsible for the loss.”).
94
See id.
95
See id.
92
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target with pellets from a BB gun.96 In this case, the ammunition is
the legal liability generated by the negligence tort and the target is
those defendants, and only those defendants, who are genuinely socially responsible for the plaintiff’s harm.97 Black letter causation
doctrine can be said to be better designed to the extent that the pattern of liability it helps to generate conforms to the intended target,
and it can be said to be worse to the extent that the pattern of liability
it helps to generate is either overinclusive or underinclusive of that
target.98
Without the causation requirement, the prima facie case of negligence requires only “behavioral fault.”99 Behavioral fault involves
the defendant having acted in a way that violates an existing behavioral norm or rule.100 The existence of behavioral fault by the defendant in a negligence case is ensured by satisfaction of the breach
element of the prima facie case.101 There can be no fault by, and no
appropriate moral blaming of, the defendant for the harm experienced by the plaintiff if the defendant’s behavior, no matter how
much it might have been the physical cause of the plaintiff’s harm,
was itself not blameworthy.102

96

See Shoot Out the Star, PALADIN AMUSEMENTS, http://www.paladinamusements.com/shoot-out-the-star (last visited Sept. 28, 2022). Another analogy
might be a combination of Venn diagram ovals in which the merger of duty,
breach, actual cause and proximate cause overlap to as closely as possible coincide with genuine social responsibility. See Stewart v. Federated Dept. Stores,
Inc., 662 A.2d 753, 758 (Conn. 1995) (“In other words, legal cause can be portrayed pictorially as a Venn diagram, with the circle representing cause in fact
completely subsuming the smaller circle representing proximate cause, which
specifically focuses on that which we define as legal causation.”); see also State
v. Turay, 493 P.3d 1058, 1063–65 (Or. Ct. App. 2021) (analyzing the existence
of constitutional probable cause as the overlap of three Venn diagram circles representing crime, evidence, and location). Such an analogy, however, would lack
the boardwalk ambiance of the shoot-out-the-star carnival game. Moreover, I have
no fond childhood memories of Venn diagrams.
97
Malave-Felix v. Volvo Car Corp., 946 F.2d 967, 971 (1st Cir. 1991) (“A
person can act negligently . . . and yet escape liability if his negligent act fortuitously does not cause injury to another.”).
98
See Doull v. Foster, 163 N.E.3d 976, 991 (Mass. 2021).
99
See supra notes 52–57 and accompanying text.
100
See Coleman, supra note 28, at 370.
101
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
102
See Coleman, supra note 28, at 370.
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So, causation doctrine operates within negligence in an environment in which one aspect of genuine social responsibility—behavioral fault—is already accounted for, and causation doctrine need
not therefore cover that contingency.103
What remains to be done? At the very least, causation doctrine
needs to ensure the existence in every case of what I have called
“consequential fault.”104 As discussed above, both behavioral fault
(norm violating behavior by the defendant) and consequential fault
(that behavior actually causing harm) are required in order to appropriately trigger liability in a system that embraces a no harm, no foul
principle.105
Ensuring the existence of consequential fault is the primary
work of the actual cause prong of the causation requirement.106 That
work is primarily done by the but-for test of causation, requiring the
plaintiff to establish that the defendant’s breaching behavior was
part of the chain of actual, physical causation that extended from
that breaching behavior to the harm suffered by the plaintiff and for
which the plaintiff is seeking compensation from the defendant by
means of the negligence claim.107
V.
THE UNDERINCLUSIVE PROBLEM OF ACTUAL CAUSE
The but-for test of actual cause performs exceptionally well in
terms of it including within negligence liability all defendants who
are properly thought to be genuinely socially responsible for the
103

See id.
See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text.
105
A person’s tortious conduct need only be a cause of the plaintiff’s harm
and not the sole cause. Peterson v. Gray, 628 A.2d 244, 246 (N.H. 1993) (“[A]
plaintiff does not have to show that a defendant’s negligence was the sole cause
of his or her injuries.”); Holmes v. Levine, 639 S.E.2d 235, 239 (Va. 2007) (confirming that “more than one proximate cause” can exist.).
106
See Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal
Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90
YALE L.J. 1353, 1353–55, 1373–76 (1981) (asserting that causation is a distinct
aspect from harm and damages).
107
David A. Fischer, Successive Causes and the Enigma of Duplicated Harm,
66 TENN. L. REV. 1127, 1129 (1999) (“Courts generally use the ‘but-for’ test to
determine what harm was caused by an injury.”); Michael S. Moore, Causation
and Responsibility, 16 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 1, 8 n.34 (1999) (but-for is the “dominant test for cause-in-fact”).
104
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plaintiff’s harm.108 It is, in this respect, one of the great products of
the common law.109 Using a straight-forward, elegant formulation
that is relatively easy for laypersons on juries to understand and employ, the but-for test effectively captures nearly all instances of negligence defendants who would be generally regarded as being socially responsible, and therefore at fault for, the plaintiff’s injuries.110 From the perspective of avoiding mistakes of under inclusiveness, the but-for test should be credited with being excellent.111
Excellent, but not perfect. There are two well-known exceptions
to the but-for test as the means of determining whether or not actual
cause can be established in a negligence action.112 Both respond to
relatively rare instances of under inclusiveness.113
A. Concurrent Cause
The more common of the two exceptions is generally known as
concurrent cause.114 It arises in cases in which there existed more

108

See Moore, supra note 107, at 8.
See generally id. at 8, n.34.
110
See Richard W. Wright, Substantive Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV.
625, 626 (1992) (“[T]he concept of causation . . . seems to be intuitively comprehended and applied to particular situations in a fairly consistent fashion, without
any explicit elaboration of the precise content of the concept.”); David W. Robertson, Causation in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Three Arguable Mistakes,
44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1007, 1010 (2009) (“In defining factual causation as
but-for causation, tort law exhibits the conspicuous virtue of cleaving to the views
of its constituency. And demonstrably judges and jurors use the but-for test on a
daily basis to do good routine work.” (footnotes omitted)).
111
PETER CANE, ATIYAH’S ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 95 (5th
ed. 1993) (“In the great majority of cases, this requirement of ‘but-for’ or ‘factual
causation’ gives rise to no practical difficulties.”).
112
STEVEN L. EMANUEL, TORTS Ch. 6, § I.C–D (10th ed. 2015).
113
See id.
114
Restatement (Third) of Torts chooses to call this doctrine “multiple sufficient causes,” though it remains widely known as the concurrent cause doctrine.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 27 (AM. L. INST. 2010); Stahl v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 438 So. 2d 14, 18 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983) (“In these so-called ‘concurrent cause’ cases [where each of the
concurrent causes alone could have produced-in-fact the plaintiff’s injury], the
Florida courts have abandoned sub silentio the ‘but for’ test and have employed
instead a ‘substantial factor’ test for the obvious reason that adherence to the ‘but
for’ test in this limited type of case leads to anomalous and unacceptable results.”)
(alteration in original); see also EMANUEL, supra note 112, at Ch. 6, § I.B. See
109
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than one sufficient actual cause for the plaintiff’s harm.115 In such
cases, the but-for test is overwhelmed by multiple sufficient actual
causes and, as a result, excludes as a legal actual cause of the plaintiff’s harm, the actions of a defendant who is without much question
genuinely socially responsible for that harm.116
For example, suppose that the plaintiff owns a remote cabin in a
forest. Defendant 1 unreasonably carelessly starts a fire in that same
forest north of the plaintiff’s cabin and the fire burns toward the
south. Defendant 2, independently, unreasonably carelessly starts a
fire in the same forest just west of the plaintiff’s cabin and that fire
burns toward the east. The two separate and independent fires converge at the site of the plaintiff’s cabin, and it is burned to the
ground.117
In such a scenario, without some exception or alteration to the
but-for test, the plaintiff would be left with no possibility of recovery

generally Charles E. Carpenter, Concurrent Causation, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 941,
942 (1935).
115
Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 451 (2014) (“[T]he ‘most common’ exception to the but-for causation requirement is applied where ‘multiple
sufficient causes independently . . .produce a result.’” (quoting Burrage v. United
States, 571 U.S. 204, 214 (2014))); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 Reporters’ Note, cmt. a (AM. L.
INST. 2010) (“There is near universal recognition of the inappropriateness of the
but-for standard for factual causation when multiple sufficient causes exist.” (citations omitted)).
116
Sometimes this phenomenon is described by saying that the plaintiff’s
harm was overdetermined. See Wright, supra note 4, at 1775 (defining overdetermined causation as “cases in which a factor other than the specified act would
have been sufficient to produce the injury in the absence of the specified act, but
its effect either (1) were preempted by the more immediately operative effects of
the specified act or (2) combined with or duplicated those of the specified act to
jointly produce the injury.”); L.E. Loeb, Causal Theories and Causal Overdetermination, 71 J. PHIL. 525, 533 (1974) (“([I]n cases of causal overdetermination
more than one minimal sufficient condition for an event is present or actually occurs.); see also J.L. Mackie, THE CEMENT OF THE UNIVERSE: A STUDY OF
CAUSATION 43–47, 164–165 (1974).
117
See Kingston v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 211 N.W. 913, 914 (Wis. 1927) (describing the facts of two fires combining to create one); Anderson v. Minneapolis,
St. Paul & S.S. M. Ry., 179 N.W. 45 (Minn. 1920) (describing the facts of two
fires combining to create one).
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through a negligence claim.118 The plaintiff would be unable, factually, to establish that the actions of either Defendant 1 or Defendant
2 were, separately and independently, a but-for actual cause of the
harm.119 This is the case because in the complete absence of Defendant 1’s carelessness, the plaintiff would have nevertheless suffered
the same harm, thus excluding Defendant 1’s carelessness as a butfor cause of the harm.120 The same analysis and conclusion apply to
Defendant 2’s carelessness in this situation. There being no such
thing in law under these circumstances as “Defendant 1 and Defendant 2” together, treated as a single, unified entity against whom the
but-for test could be established,121 the plaintiff is left without a successful negligence claim against either one alone, meaning that the
plaintiff is left with no successful negligence claim at all.122
In such, and similar, circumstances, courts have labeled the unreasonably careless actions of both Defendant 1 and Defendant 2 as
“concurrent causes” and have altered the actual causation instruction
provided to the jury from the but-for test to a question of whether
the individual defendant’s breaching behavior was a “substantial

See Doull v. Foster, 163 N.E.3d 976, 991 (Mass. 2021) (“Therefore, in the
rare case presenting the problem of multiple sufficient causes, the jury should receive additional instructions on factual causation [in addition to the but-for test].
Such instructions should begin with the illustration from the Restatement (Third)
of the twin fires example so that the complicated concept can be more easily understood by the jury. After the illustration, the jury should be instructed, ‘A defendant whose tortious act was fully capable of causing the plaintiff’s harm should
not escape liability merely because of the happenstance of another sufficient
cause, like the second fire, operating at the same time.’” (footnote omitted)).
119
See Maxwell v. KPMG LLP, 520 F.3d 713, 716 (7th Cir. 2008) (“There
are also cases in which a condition that is not necessary, but is sufficient, is
deemed the cause of an injury, as when two fires join and destroy the plaintiff’s
property and each one would have destroyed it by itself and so was not a necessary
condition; yet each of the firemakers (if negligent) is liable to the plaintiff for
having ‘caused’ the injury.” (citations omitted)).
120
See Doull, 163 N.E.3d at 985.
121
See id.
122
DOBBS, supra note 24, at 414–15 (2000) (“When each of two or more
causes would be sufficient, standing alone, to cause the plaintiff’s harm, a literal
and simple version of the but-for test holds that neither defendant’s act is a cause
of the harm. . . . [A] court that applied the unvarnished but-for test here would
effectively bar the victim from any recovery from either of the two negligent defendants.”).
118
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factor,” or, in some jurisdictions, a “material element,” in the physical infliction of harm on the plaintiff.123 Such an alteration of the
legal test for actual cause would, in a situation such as the one described above, permit a jury to find that either or both of the Defendants were an actual cause of the harm to the plaintiff’s cabin, even
though the actions of each Defendant, separately, clearly do not satisfy the usual but-for test of actual cause.124
Why would courts over a long period of time recognize these
concurrent cause cases as requiring some alteration to the usual butfor test for actual cause? What is unacceptably wrong with the result
dictated by the use of the usual but-for test of actual causation in
these cases?125
Vecchione v. Carlin, 111 Cal. App. 3d 351, 359 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (“In
those few situations, where there are concurrent causes, our law provides one cannot escape responsibility for his negligence on the ground that identical harm
would have occurred without it. The proper rule for such situations is that the
defendant’s conduct is a cause of the event because it is a material element and a
substantial factor in bringing it about.” (citations omitted)); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 Reporters’
Note, cmt. j (AM. L. INST. 2010) (“In the instance of multiple sufficient causes,
however, the substantial factor test can be useful because it substitutes for the butfor test in a situation in which the but-for test fails to accomplish what the law
demands. Many courts reserve its use for that specific situation.”); Verdicchio v.
Ricca, 843 A.2d 1042, 1056 (N.J. 2004) (employing the substantial-factor test and
justifying its use based on necessity when there are multiple sufficient causes in a
case).
124
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 26 cmt. j (AM. L. INST. 2010) (“[S]ome courts have accepted the proposition that, although the plaintiff cannot show the defendant’s tortious conduct
was a but-for cause of harm by a preponderance of the evidence, the plaintiff may
still prevail by showing that the tortious conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm.”).
125
Though acknowledgment and description of concurrent cause cases and the
exception that they represent to the but-for test for actual cause is prevalent in the
negligence literature, there is a striking lack of satisfying explanation for this phenomenon. Often, the policy challenge that these kind of cases pose to the but-for
test is assumed, or simply stated as if self-evident. See infra note 139 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM. § 27 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2010). Uncomplicated application
of the but-for test to the facts presented in these cases results clearly and unambiguously in a conclusion that none of the defendants are a but-for cause of the
harm suffered by the plaintiff and would mean that the plaintiff could hold none
of them liable. Why, exactly, is this an unacceptable result?
123
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The answer suggested by the understanding of the causation requirement offered herein is that the unaltered use of the usual butfor test in these cases results in an inappropriate resolution of the
negligence claims in as much as it dictates a lack of liability for one
or more defendants who are genuinely socially responsible for the
plaintiff’s harm.126 In these circumstances, both Defendant 1 and
Defendant 2 possess both behavioral fault and consequential fault
with respect to the harm suffered by the plaintiff, and as such they
are appropriate targets of liability under a no harm, no foul principle.127 They are arguably genuinely socially responsible for the harm
to the plaintiff’s cabin.128 The existence of another, independent and
sufficient cause of the harm (the other fire) is not relevant to the
blameworthiness of either Defendant.129 The presence of another independent and sufficient cause is a coincidence in these situations
that in itself does not relieve either actor from full moral and social
responsibility for the harm.130 In other words, each Defendant is as
much at fault (at every level) for this injury despite the other actor’s
existence and actions.131
The fundamental purpose of the causation requirement is the
limiting of negligence liability to only those defendants who are
genuinely socially responsible for the harm to the plaintiff.132 One
is not genuinely socially responsible if one did not actually cause the
harm to occur.133 In the overwhelming percentage of circumstances,
whether a person actually caused harm to another can be determined
by asking whether the harm would have nevertheless been experienced by the plaintiff even in the absence of the defendant’s behavior.134 In relatively unusual circumstances, however, the but-for test
is overwhelmed by multiple sufficient causes of the plaintiff’s

126

See Verdicchio, 843 A.2d at 1056.
See Moore, supra note 107, at 10; see also Daniels v. Aldridge Pite Haan,
LLP, No. 5:20-cv-00089-TES, 2020 WL 3866649, at *1 (M.D. Ga. July 8, 2020).
128
See Kingston v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 211 N.W. 913, 914 (Wis. 1927).
129
See id.
130
See id.
131
See id.
132
See Moore, supra note 107, at 1.
133
See id.
134
See Kingston, 211 N.W. at 915.
127
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harm.135 In these cases, the but-for test comes out wrong in terms of
its fundamental purpose as it identifies certain behavior as not being
a legal actual cause of the harm when a jury might well reasonably
conclude that the person who engaged in that behavior was genuinely socially responsible for it.136 In such circumstances, the butfor test, seen through the lens of its underlying function in the negligence tort, is underinclusive, and therefore not performing its policy function appropriately.137
The alternative to the but-for test for actual cause used by courts
in cases of concurrent cause—that the defendant’s unreasonably
careless behavior was a substantial factor, or a material element, in
the infliction of harm upon the plaintiff—provides the jury an opportunity to find the defendant liable to the plaintiff for negligence
if they believe that the defendant was genuinely socially responsible
for the plaintiff’s experience of harm, an opportunity not reasonably
available to them if they are required to use the but-for test to determine actual cause.138
135
United States v. Monzel, 746 F. Supp. 2d 76, 86 (D.D.C. 2010) (“In cases
such as these where there are ‘multiple sufficient causes’ of the injury, courts generally regard but-for or factual causation as inappropriate.” (citations omitted)).
136
Robert J. Peaslee, Multiple Causation and Damage, 47 HARV. L. REV.
1127, 1128–29 (1934) (emphasizing that the application of the substantial factor
test to all cases of multiple causation leads to troublesome outcomes).
137
The critical advantage of either the substantial factor or the material element test for actual cause as a substitute for the but-for test is that they are less
fixed and determined and far more factually vague, thus more flexible. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 27 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2010). In concurrent cause cases, for example, no one
can reasonably say that one cause alone (and thus any one defendant) was a butfor cause of the harm. See id. at § 27 cmt. a. Such a conclusion by the trier of fact
should not survive scrutiny by the trier of law. See id. In contrast, it is far more
difficult to say with similar confidence that no one cause alone was not a substantial factor, or a material element, in the infliction of the harm on the plaintiff. See
id. at § 27(c). Thus, the alternative tests permit an actual cause decision in favor
of the plaintiff that can survive scrutiny by the trier of law when the but-for test
does not. See Monzel, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 86. It is this very flexibility of result that
recommends both substantial factor and material element as substitute tests for
actual cause in concurrent cause cases rather than any technical advantage that
they enjoy in accurately identifying actual causation in fact. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 cmt. c (AM.
L. INST. 2010).
138
This practical consequence of the concurrent cause doctrine is recognized,
and then decried, by Robert J. Peaslee. Peaslee, supra note 136, at 1128–29
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Recognizing that the concurrent cause doctrine and its alternative tests for actual cause function in this manner and for these purposes lead the way to the formulation of an appropriate test, or
threshold, to be used by courts in deciding whether or not to declare
a given set of circumstances a concurrent cause situation. At present,
such a test is strikingly absent in the cases and the academic literature on concurrent cause.139 A court should determine that a given
negligence case is a concurrent cause case, and should provide the
jury with an alternative test for actual cause, whenever in the court’s
judgment: (1) a reasonable application of the but-for test to the facts
of the case should result in a determination of no actual cause; and
(2) a reasonable juror could nevertheless conclude based on the facts
that the defendant was genuinely socially responsible for the plaintiff’s harm.

(“Even though the defendant’s act was not a necessary factor and the same result
would have ensued without it, the jury are to decide whether or not it was a substantial factor, and fix liability or non-liability accordingly. What is it that the jury
are to consider in such a situation? The defendant’s dereliction is conceded, and
there seems to be but one test for the jury to apply. If they think that on the whole
he ought to pay they will find against him, and vice versa.” (footnote omitted)).
139
Rationales traditionally offered for the existence of the concurrent cause
doctrine tend to be vague and couched in the abstract language of unfairness or
common sense. For example, Restatement (Third) offers the following as a rationale for the doctrine: “Multiple sufficient causes are also factual causes because
we recognize them as such in our common understanding of causation, even if the
but-for test does not. Thus, the standard for causation in this Section comports
with deep-seated intuitions about causation and fairness in attributing responsibility.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 27 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2010). Subsequently, in the Reporters’ Notes
section to this same section 27 comment c, there is provided an illustrative series
of attempts by scholars to provide a satisfying rationale for the doctrine, which
includes: “Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability
for Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REV. 941, 968 (2001) (upholding the ‘dignity of
the law’ requires modifying the but-for standard)” and “March v. E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd. (1991) 171 C.L.R. 506, 516 (Austl.) (‘The cases demonstrate the
lesson of experience, namely that the [but-for] test, applied as an exclusive criterion of causation, yields unacceptable results . . . .’)”. It also includes that “Professors Hart and Honoré do not even attempt a justification, merely observing: ‘It
is perfectly intelligible that in these circumstances a legal system should treat each
as the cause rather than neither, as the sine qua non test would require.’” Id. at
§ 27, Reporters’ Note, cmt. c.
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B.
Summers v. Tice
A second instance of courts permitting negligence liability to be
imposed on a defendant despite the plaintiff’s clear inability to satisfy the but-for test of actual cause is illustrated by the famous case
of Summers v. Tice.140 In this case, three hunters together went out
with shotguns into an open range to hunt quail.141 At some point
during the adventure, one hunter (eventually the plaintiff) became
separated and stood uphill from the other two.142 Sometime thereafter, a quail was flushed and flew between the plaintiff and the two
defendants.143 Both of the defendants shot in the direction of the
quail, which was also in the direction of the plaintiff. One shotgun
pellet struck the plaintiff in the upper lip and another stuck him in
the eye, though it was the injury to the eye that was the dominant
cause of harm.144 There was, at that time, no means of determining
from which of the two shotguns the seriously damaging pellet came,
and thus no way of determining which of the defendants was the
actual cause of the plaintiff’s legally meaningful injuries.145 The trial
court found, and the Supreme Court affirmed, that the defendants
acted with unreasonable carelessness in shooting as they did, and
that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent for his own injury.146
Summers v. Tice presents a situation in which two parties (two
possible defendants) act in an unreasonably careless manner toward
the plaintiff.147 One of the two parties actually causes meaningful
harm to the plaintiff, the other does not, and no one, including the
plaintiff and the two possible defendants, will ever know who as
between the two defendants is the actual harm-producer.148

140

Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 1 (Cal. 1948). The doctrine illustrated by this
well-known case is sometimes referred to as “alternative liability.” See also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 28 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2010).
141
Summers, 199 P.2d at 2.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
See id. at 3.
146
Id. at 2, 5.
147
See id. at 3–4.
148
See id. at 4.
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Similar to concurrent cause cases, though in a different way,
Summers v. Tice presents the injured plaintiff with a fatal obstacle
to establishing the actual cause prong of the causation requirement,
and thus prevents the plaintiff from satisfying the prima facie case
for negligence. In a case like Summers v. Tice, the probability of
either defendant having actually caused the harm to the plaintiff is
exactly 50%.149 The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing every
element of the negligence prima facie case to a preponderance of the
evidence, which, absent whatever else it might require, requires that
the plaintiff establish each element as being at least more likely than
not—a threshold which, by definition, a 50% probability cannot
meet.150
Also similar to concurrent cause cases, Summers v. Tice presents
a situation wherein a plaintiff cannot establish the actual cause requirement against at least one defendant who is genuinely socially
responsible for the plaintiff’s injury.151 In this way, both kinds of
cases feature a malfunction of the proper purpose underlying the
causation requirement in which its normal operation results in the
impossibility of liability being imposed on a party who has acted
with unreasonable carelessness and in so doing caused the plaintiff
harm for which the defendant was genuinely socially responsible.152
Unlike concurrent cause cases, however, the situation illustrated
by Summers v. Tice cannot be satisfactorily handled by offering the
jury an alternative test for actual cause, such as substantial factor or
material element.153 The problem posed by Summers v. Tice is, in a
sense, more difficult than that. The plaintiff in a case like Summers
v. Tice simply cannot establish that either defendant was any part of
149

See id. at 2, 3.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 26 cmt. 1 (AM. L. INST. 2010) (“The burden of proof in civil actions requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence. . . . [A] plaintiff must prove that
it is more likely than not that, if the defendant had not acted tortiously, the plaintiff’s harm would not have occurred. . . . So long as the defendant’s tortious conduct was more likely than not a factual cause of the harm, the plaintiff has established the element of factual cause.”); Stinson v. England, 633 N.E.2d 532, 537
(Ohio 1994) (“[A]n event is probable if there is a greater than fifty percent likelihood that it produced the occurrence at issue.” (citations omitted)).
151
See Summers, 199 P.2d. at 4.
152
See EMANUEL, supra note 112, at Ch. 6, § I.C–D.
153
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 26 cmt. 1 (AM. L. INST. 2010).
150
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the actual chain of events that resulted in the plaintiff’s injury—any
part of actual cause—by more than a 50% probability, which, as
noted above, is too little to meet the preponderance of the evidence
standard.154 Neither defendant can be shown to have been more than
50% likely to have been the but-for actual cause of the plaintiff’s
injury, a substantial factor in the infliction of that injury, a material
element in the actual cause of that injury, or having had any part
whatsoever to play in the actual infliction of the harm.155
As such, an alteration of the but-for test for actual cause will not
suffice.156 A court can only provide the plaintiff relief from a situation like Summers v. Tice by granting the plaintiff a presumption of
the satisfaction of the actual cause prong of the causation requirement, or provide the plaintiff no relief at all.157 While extreme on its
face, this alternative is strong remedial relief in as much as it operates as an exception to the basic legal requirement that the plaintiff
bear the burden of proof for every element of the prima facie case,
including the actual cause requirement.158
The analysis of the causation requirement in negligence offered
herein provides a sophisticated and powerful understanding of the
traditional willingness of courts in cases like Summers v. Tice and
its progeny to provide plaintiffs with this extraordinary remedy, and
the long-standing decision of the Restatements to endorse those decisions.159
154

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 28 cmt. i (AM. L. INST. 2010) (“In these circumstances [such as Summers
v. Tice], no reasonable inference could be drawn that more likely than not any one
of the defendants’ tortious conduct was a cause of the plaintiff’s harm.” (emphasis
in original)).
155
See id.
156
See id.
157
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 28 cmt. g (AM. L. INST. 2010).
158
See Joe W. Sanders, The Anatomy of Proof in Civil Actions, 28 LA. L. REV.
297, 306 (1968) (“The plaintiff has the burden of proving the casual link by a
preponderance of the evidence. This means the evidence should convince the trier
of fact that more probably than not defendant’s conduct was . . . [an actual cause
of] . . . plaintiff’s harm.”).
159
The rationales for the doctrine offered by Restatement (Second) and Restatement (Third) are rather thin, most especially for a rule that serves as a stark
exception to the usual foundational requirement that the plaintiff affirmatively establish actual causation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. g (AM. L. INST. 2010) (“The rationale
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To begin, what is the argument forwarded by defendants in cases
like Summers v. Tice to urge courts not to create an exception to the
normal operation of the actual cause doctrine, and to thereby allow
that normal operation to prevent the plaintiff from satisfying the
prima facie case for negligence against either defendant? The basic
thrust of this argument is that allowing the plaintiff to hold these
defendants liable under these circumstances would represent an exception to, and thus in a sense a violation and compromise of, the
policies underlying the long-standing rule that imposes on the plaintiff the burden of proof to establish every required element of the
prima facie case of negligence, including the prima facie requirement of actual cause.160 There are important policies and values that
support the placement of the burden of proof on the plaintiff, and
there should exist important countervailing policies and values that
are served whenever an exception to that rule is recognized and implemented.161
Moreover, providing the plaintiff in cases like Summers v. Tice
an opportunity to satisfy the actual cause requirement when it cannot
be done under the normal operation of the doctrine will result in both
for shifting the burden of proof to defendants whose tortious conduct exposed the
plaintiff to a risk of harm is that, as between two culpable defendants and an innocent plaintiff, it is preferable to put the risk of error on the culpable defendants.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 1965)
(“[T]he reason for the exception is the injustice of permitting proved wrongdoers,
who among them have inflicted an injury upon the entirely innocent plaintiff, to
escape liability merely because the nature of their conduct and the resulting harm
has made it difficult or impossible to prove which of them has caused the harm.”).
Neither rationale connects the exception to established tort policy, provides much
of any guidance as to when the exception should and should not be allowed by
courts, nor meaningfully distinguishes it from res ipsa loquitor.
160
Woods Hole Oceanographic Inst. v. ATS Specialized, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 3d
369, 374 (D. Mass. 2021) (“Because causation is an essential element of a negligence claim, a plaintiff cannot prevail if evidence of causation is unavailable. . . . [A] plaintiff cannot avoid summary judgment if it is unable to show that
there is greater probability than not that the accident resulted from the defendant’s
negligence.” (internal citations omitted)).
161
See RICHARD H. GASKINS, BURDENS OF PROOF IN MODERN DISCOURSE 21
(1992) (recognizing a presumption of non-liability of civil defendants); Dale A.
Nance, Civility and the Burden of Proof, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 647, 660–
61 (1994) (arguing that a fundamental asymmetry in overall exposure, risk of error, and nature of consequence between the defendant and the plaintiff in a tort
action justifies placing burdens of proof on the plaintiff).
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defendants being held liable.162 This means that with respect to one
of the two defendants, the case will unquestionably come out wrong;
one defendant will be held liable when he or she did not in fact cause
the harm in question to the plaintiff.163 Such a result violates the
basic no harm, no foul principle embedded in the causation requirement, and thus in the negligence tort, with respect to that defendant.164 It is an obvious, fully foreseeable, and unjust consequence of
providing the plaintiff with an exception to the normal burden of
proving actual cause to a preponderance of the evidence.165
How can plaintiffs in these cases possibly justify this kind of
outcome: the intentional, cold-eyed imposition of negligence liability on a party who is known not to have caused the plaintiff the harm
for which that party is being held liable (even if no one knows which
party that is)? Such an outcome not only carves out for the plaintiff
an exception to the usual rules regarding burden of proof, but it also
carves out an exception to the requirement that negligence liability
(and to a large extent tort law liability generally) be contingent upon
the defendant having actually caused the harm to the plaintiff for
which the defendant is being held liable.166 This is not an instance
of traditional strict liability—liability with causation but without
fault—and is instead liability with fault but without causation.167
How can this be justified?
As with the presentation by defendants, the argument by the
plaintiffs in support of an extraordinary remedy in these circumstances begins by stressing that the failure to impose such an exception will also result in the foreseeable, and thus intentional, and
equally cold-eyed resolution of the negligence claim against one of

162

Peter Nash Swisher, Causation Requirements in Tort and Insurance Law
Practice: Demystifying Some Legal Causation “Riddles,” 43 TORT TRIAL & INS.
PRAC. L. J. 1, 6 (2007) (“In order to solve this dilemma, the Summers v. Tice court
shifted the burden on proof to require that defendants prove that they were not the
cause of plaintiff’s injury; and if defendants were unable to exculpate themselves,
then both defendants would be found liable as joint tortfeasors.”).
163
See id.
164
See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
165
Sanders, supra note 158, at 306.
166
See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
167
See Woods Hole Oceanographic Inst. v. ATS Specialized, Inc., 514
F. Supp. 3d 369, 374 (D. Mass. 2021).
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the defendants in the wrong way.168 One of these defendants did in
fact act in an unreasonably careless manner and as a result actually
caused tangible harm to the plaintiff.169 Every purpose and policy of
tort law dictates the imposition of liability upon that defendant to the
compensatory benefit of the plaintiff.170 In other words, there is
more than one kind of mistake that can be made in the resolution of
these cases: (1) the imposition of liability when it is not appropriately justified; and (2) the failure to impose liability when it is fully
justified.171 Part of what makes situations like Summers v. Tice so
endlessly interesting to students and scholars of tort law is that they
present a circumstance in which either one or the other of the mistakes must be made.
Given the inevitability of at least one bad outcome no matter
how courts choose to resolve the issue of actual cause in this class
of cases, are there reasons to prefer one kind of mistake over the
other? Plaintiffs could argue that there are.
What are the more specific tort law policy costs and benefits attached to each possible resolution of these kinds of cases? If the
plaintiff is granted relief by the court from the actual cause dilemma,
then both defendants will be held liable.172 This outcome will, with
respect to one of the two defendants, violate the no harm, no foul
principle of actual cause (and negligence), and thereby violate the
norm that negligence liability should only be imposed when the defendant was genuinely socially responsible for the harm inflicted
upon the plaintiff.173 However, while one of the two defendants did
not possess consequential fault for the plaintiff’s injuries, he did
possess behavioral fault in as much as he acted in an unreasonably
careless manner.174 Thus, this resolution of the claim, while in violation of the no harm, no foul principle, does result in deterrence of
the defendant’s unreasonably careless behavior.175 It also serves the

168
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 28 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2010).
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
See id. at § 29 cmt. e.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Id.
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basic compensation goal of tort law by providing the plaintiff with
an additional source of assets for recovery and rehabilitation.176
Put differently, it could be argued that by granting the plaintiff
in these kind of cases a presumption of the satisfaction of the actual
cause requirement of the prima facie case, courts can advance, even
with respect to the defendant who did not in fact cause any harm,
both an appropriate deterrence objective and an appropriate compensation objective. However, achieving such objectives will come
at the cost of violating the no harm, no foul principle of negligence
liability.177 In addition, the court gets it entirely correct with respect
to the defendant who did in fact cause the plaintiff injury by his unreasonably careless act.178
What is the contrasting account of costs and benefits if the court
instead denies the plaintiff any relief on the actual cause requirement
and neither defendant is held liable? With respect to the defendant
who did in fact cause the harm, the court gets it entirely wrong and
thereby forgoes an appropriate opportunity for deterrence and compensation. Additionally, the outcome also violates, in the negative,
the no harm, no foul principle.179 With respect to the defendant who
did not cause harm, an appropriate opportunity for deterrence and
compensation is missed, though the no harm, no foul principle is
appropriately honored.180
Given the choice set forth in these terms, it seems less surprising,
and less extraordinary, that courts in the Summers v. Tice line of
authority have chosen to grant plaintiffs the necessary relief with
respect to actual cause.181
This way of analyzing and understanding the actual cause requirement of negligence offers courts confronting similar Summers

176

Id.
See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
178
See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
179
See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
180
See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
181
Courts and cases following the precedent established by Summers v. Tice
include: Wysocki v. Reed, 583 N.E.2d 1139 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (two manufacturers of a defective drug); McMillan v. Mahoney, 393 S.E.2d 298 (N.C. 1990) (two
boys firing air rifles); Minnich v. Ashland Oil Co., Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1199 (Ohio
1984) (two suppliers of an explosive compound).
177
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v. Tice type problems in the future at least two kinds of guidance.182
One is that the extraordinary relief granted in Summers v. Tice is
harder to justify if both of the defendants who are held liable as a
result have not engaged in unreasonably careless behavior (i.e., do
not possess behavioral fault).183 In such circumstances, holding the
defendant liable who did not actually cause the harm serves no appropriate deterrence purpose whatsoever.184 Holding that defendant
liable thereby shifts from providing a partial deterrence benefit (in
the Summers v. Tice situation) to providing no deterrence benefit at
all, and thus, must be viewed as involving pure cost (or error) from
a deterrence perspective.185
Secondly, the extraordinary relief granted in Summers v. Tice is
harder to justify if there are more than two defendants involved and
still just one possible source of actual harm.186 This is the case because in such circumstances, the benefit of resolving the case correctly with respect to one of the defendants comes at the cost of getting it wrong with respect to more than just one of the others.187 The
more defendants there are who could not have actually caused the
harm compared with the number of sources of possible harm, the
less attractive relief for the plaintiff becomes.188
This understanding of the Summers v. Tice line of cases would,
correctly as it has turned out thus far, have been helpful in dampening unwarranted optimism for the long-term prospects of market

182
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 28 (AM. L. INST. 2010).
183
Restatement (Third) of Torts adopts an even more forceful version of this
admonition. Id. at § 28 cmt. i (“Unless all of the actors who may have harmed the
plaintiff acted tortiously, the rationale for invoking alternative liability is absent.
Courts continue, without exception, to turn away plaintiffs who are unable to establish this element.”).
184
See id. at § 29, Reporters’ Notes cmt. e.
185
See id.
186
See id. at § 28 cmt. f.
187
See id.
188
Restatement (Third) of Torts agrees, but only to a point. While acknowledging that “[t]here is a stronger intuitive appeal to alternative liability when there
are only two defendants, and each is equally likely to have been the factual cause
of another’s harm . . . ,” it concludes that “[n]evertheless, the rationale for alternative liability . . . applies as well when there are more than two such culpable
parties.” Id. at § 28 cmt. k.
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share liability when it emerged in the 1980s.189 A variation on both
the basic facts and the result in Summers v. Tice,190 market share
liability cases often involve at least one of the attributes identified
in the above analysis as being problematic to the granting of special
relief to the plaintiff: more defendants (often many more) than possible sources of actual harm.191
The understanding of actual causation offered herein would also
counsel caution regarding attempts to refine or recast the but-for test
of actual cause in ways that significantly complicate the matter without providing sufficient corresponding benefits in terms of improving or refining the ability of the test to accurately identify genuine
social responsibility by the defendant.192 Complication is a real and
quite tangible cost in this context, one that is tempting to ignore or
to discount from an academic perspective.193 A doctrine like actual
cause and a test like but-for causation must be used by lay persons
serving on juries and it is simply impractical (and unrealistic) to expect that courts will provide jury members with a separate training

189

See id. at § 28 cmt. p; see also James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski,
Intuition and Technology in Product Design Litigation: An Essay in Proximate
Causation, 88 GEO. L. J. 659, 660 (2000) (“The market-share experiment now is
generally perceived to have been an interesting idea that simply doesn’t work.
Like Michelangelo’s horse, it doesn’t fly.” (footnote omitted)); Senn v. MerrellDow Pharms., Inc. 751 P.2d 215, 223 (Or. 1988) (“We conclude that adoption of
any theory of alternative liability requires a profound change in fundamental tort
principles of causation, an adjustment rife with public policy ramifications. The
legislature may study and adopt one or another such theory, but we cannot pretend
that any such theory is consistent with common law principles of tort liability.”).
190
See generally Mark A. Geistfeld, The Doctrinal Unity of Alternative Liability and Market-Share Liability, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 447 (2006) (exploring the
“doctrinal unity” between market-share liability and alternative liability through
evidential grouping).
191
In the founding case of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, the Supreme Court
of California states, “There is an important difference between the situation involved in Summers and the present case. There, all the parties who were or could
have been responsible for the harm to the plaintiff were joined as defendants.
Here, by contrast, there are approximately 200 drug companies which made DES,
any of which might have manufactured the injury inducing drug.” 607 P.2d 924,
930–31 (Cal. 1980).
192
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 29 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 2010).
193
See id.
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session or seminar so that they might understand a complicated approach to the actual cause requirement of the negligence claim.194
Moreover, it is often the goal of such efforts to improve the actual
cause test from a scientific or a philosophical perspective; this
misses the primary function of that test in the context of the negligence tort, which is to provide a first-level measure of the defendant’s genuine social responsibility for the harm inflicted upon the
plaintiff.195
VI.

THE OVERINCLUSIVE PROBLEM OF ACTUAL CAUSE AND THE
NEED FOR A PROXIMATE CAUSE REQUIREMENT
While the but-for test for actual cause does a generally excellent
job of including within negligence liability all of those defendants
who are genuinely socially responsible for the harm experienced by
the plaintiff, it performs far less well in terms of its over inclusiveness.196 If taken literally, which is what the jury instruction typically
charges triers of fact to do, the but-for test for actual cause includes
within its scope a great many possible defendants who may have
engaged in unreasonably careless behavior, but who would not be

194

Chantelle M. Baguley et al., Deconstructing the Simplification of Jury Instructions: How Simplifying the Features of Complexity Affects Jurors’ Application of Instructions, 41 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 284, 285 (2017) (“Empirical research consistently shows that jurors have difficulty comprehending the key principles outlined in standardized instructions, including the legal concepts and the
procedural rules that underlie the decision process. . . . This is problematic because, if jurors cannot understand the instructions, they will rely on factors other
than the instructions to decide their verdict.”); William V. Luneburg & Mark A.
Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of Modern Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L. REV.
887, 891 (1981) (“As modern life has grown more complicated, so has modern
litigation. It is not at all clear that the abilities of juries have kept pace. A number
of federal courts, faced with complex cases on their civil dockets, have concluded
that some such cases may be beyond the capabilities of the ordinary jury.”).
195
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 29 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2010).
196
Wright, supra note 110, at 682 (“If outcome responsibility makes us normatively responsible for all the consequences of our volitional acts and omissions,
then, once again, all of us are responsible for everything.”).
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considered genuinely socially responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries.197
One classic statement of this circumstance appears in the famous
case of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Company:198
A boy throws a stone into a pond. The ripples spread.
The water level rises. The history of that pond is altered for all eternity. It will be altered by other causes
also. Yet it will be forever the resultant of all causes
combined. Each one will have an influence. How
great only omniscience can say. You may speak of a
chain, or if you please, a net. An analogy is of little
aid. Each cause brings about future events. Without
each the future would not be the same.199
A virtually endless number of prior behaviors by others are literally but-for required in order for the defendant in a particular negligence case to even have physically been at a specific place, at a
specific time so that his or her unreasonably careless behavior would
result in harm to the plaintiff.200 Without some additional formal
limitation in the prima facie case, all of these persons who engaged
Mackin & Assocs. v. Harris, 672 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Md. 1996) (“The ‘but
for’ test has some value in the determination of causation. If a set of facts cannot
pass the ‘but for’ test, causation in fact is ruled out. The converse is not true–if a
fact situation passes the ‘but for’ test, the requisite causation is not necessarily
established. That is so because the literal application of the ‘but for’ test may fail
to exclude causation links that are metaphysically conceivable but practically and
legally absurd.”); Michael Keeley et al., Insuring Agreement (E)–Revisited, 17
FIDELITY L.J. 203, 247–48 (2011) (“The cause in fact or ‘but for’ test of causation,
carried to its logical extreme, has been likened to the expansive chain of causation
that Winston Churchill constructed in his history of the First World War.
‘[Churchill] began by referring to the fact that in 1920 King Alexander died by
blood poisoning, having been bitten by a pet monkey. This event was followed by
plebiscite, then a new king, and finally a bloody war with the Turks. Churchill
wrote, ‘A quarter of a million persons died of that monkey’s bite.’’” (alteration in
original)).
198
Palsgraf v Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
199
Id. at 103.
200
ARNO C. BECHT & FRANK W. MILLER, THE TEST OF FACTUAL CAUSATION
IN NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY CASES 12 (1961) (“Our assumption, then,
simply is that any particular event has a host of causes, an unlimited number . . . .”).
197
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in behavior that could be characterized as being in some way unreasonably careless would be potentially subject to liability to the plaintiff for negligence.201
Imagine, for example, a very simple negligence case in which
the plaintiff claims that the defendant carelessly failed to apply the
brakes of his or her car in time and, as a result, collided into the rear
of the plaintiff’s car while the plaintiff was legally stopped at a red
light. Without much doubt, the plaintiff could establish actual cause
against the defendant (Defendant 1) in these circumstances.202 Assume, however, that Defendant 1 is without assets or adequate insurance coverage or is otherwise not responsive to suit or judgment.
Plaintiff then develops evidence establishing that a different person (Defendant 2) was, on that same day, driving carelessly on a
different road on which Defendant 1 also drove before turning onto
the road on which the collision with the plaintiff occurred. Defendant 2’s unreasonably careless driving created a disturbance among
drivers on that road, which in turn caused traffic to dramatically
slow in front of Defendant 1. But for Defendant 2’s careless driving,
Defendant 1 would not have been situated behind the plaintiff’s car
at all, and thus no collision with the plaintiff’s car would have taken
place, and no harm would have been experienced by the plaintiff.
Rather clearly, Defendant 2’s unreasonably careless driving is
literally a but-for cause of the injury to the plaintiff, and it also satisfies the duty and breach elements of the prima facie case for negligence.203 Equally clearly, Defendant 2 should not be held liable to
the plaintiff under any system of liability that preconditions the imposition of liability on the defendant having been genuinely socially

201

The difficulty, both conceptual and practical, of the proximate cause requirement is legend. See, e.g., Leon Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence
Law, 28 TEX. L. REV. 471, 471–72 (1950) (“Having no integrated meaning of its
own, [the] chameleon quality [of proximate cause] permits it to be substituted for
any one of the elements of a negligence case when decision on that element becomes difficult. . . . No other formula . . . so nearly does the work of Aladdin’s
lamp.”); Fleming James Jr. & Roger F. Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L.J. 761, 762
(1951) (“The result [of the development and analysis of the proximate cause doctrine thus far] has been a widely recognized confusion, and as luxuriant a crop of
legal literature as is to be had in any branch of tort law.”).
202
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 6 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2010).
203
Id.
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responsible for the plaintiff’s harm.204 While Defendant 2’s unreasonably careless behavior was literally and physically necessary in
order for the plaintiff to have been harmed in this particular way, no
one would seriously assert that Defendant 2 was genuinely socially
responsible—was morally at fault—for the specific injuries suffered
by the plaintiff.205 Moreover, behavior of persons in a community,
including highly productive behavior, might well be paralyzed if a
system existed that imposed formal legal liability on them for careless behavior that somehow resulted in harm to another that far down
the line of actual cause.206
Note that the preceding example includes behavior by Defendant 2 that is still relatively close in time and not far on a chain of
physical causation from the infliction of injury on the plaintiff.207
The same analysis, however, would apply if Defendant 2 were a
neighbor of Defendant 1 who, coming home late and inebriated the
night before, unreasonably carelessly parked his car blocking Defendant 1’s driveway. The next morning, Defendant 1 is forced to
rouse Defendant 2 and request that he move his car before Defendant 1 can drive to work. This makes Defendant 1 late, frustrated,
perhaps preoccupied, and physically places him behind the plaintiff
that morning when he otherwise would not have been. Again, Defendant 2 is a clear but-for cause and yet, just as clearly, few would
seriously assert that Defendant 2 is genuinely socially responsible
204

See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
206
See Yuval Sinai & Benjamin Shmueli, Calabresi’s and Maimonides’s Tort
Law Theories–A Comparative Analysis and a Preliminary Sketch of a Modern
Model of Differential Pluralistic Tort Liability Based on the Two Theories, 26
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 59, 65 (2014) (“[E]xcessive deterrence may lead to the interruption of essential activity . . . .”); Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 772, 799–800 (1985) (“In determining which activity generated the injury and therefore should internalize its costs,
one must be careful to avoid excessive deterrence that may unduly restrict a useful, but risky activity.”); Israel Gilead & Michael D. Green, Positive Externalities
and the Economics of Proximate Cause, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1517, 1529
(2017) (“More realistic and contemporary economic models . . . recognize that
over-internalization through excessive tort liability may lead to over-deterrence,
not only in the form of inefficiently reduced levels of activity, but also in the form
of inefficiently increased levels of care–too many or inadequate precautions.”).
207
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 6 (AM. L. INST. 2010).
205
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for the plaintiff’s injuries.208 Examples could be offered that extend
Defendant 2’s behavior even further away in time and further back
in the chain of actual cause from the plaintiff’s injury.
A system that requires genuine social responsibility for the imposition of formal negligence liability cannot, as a design matter,
leave unaltered a prima facie case for negligence that requires only
duty, breach, actual cause, and harm.209 Such a system would generate liability that includes very large numbers of defendants who
were not arguably morally at fault for the plaintiff’s specific harm—
the harm for which the defendant is required by law to compensate
the plaintiff.210 Such a system would, in other words, be massively
overinclusive.211
The specific function of the proximate cause prong of the causation requirement in negligence is to limit, or to tailor, the scope of
liability ultimately generated by the negligence tort so that only
those defendants who are genuinely socially responsible for the
plaintiff’s harm are held liable.212 It has no other function, and its

208

Id. at § 6 cmt. b.
See id.
210
At some point, a negligence system that imposed liability on defendants
and included an actual cause requirement but no proximate cause requirement
would create a social and legal environment very much like the previously imagined negligence system that included no causation requirement. See supra notes
26–34 and accompanying text. Liability would be threatened in such a large number of circumstances in which the actual cause connection between the defendant’s unreasonably careless behavior and the plaintiff’s harm was excessively remote, that from potential defendants’ perspective it would be experienced much
like a system requiring no causation requirement at all. See supra notes 26–34 and
accompanying text. Arguably, negligence with actual cause but no proximate
cause would be markedly worse in as much as defendants’ liability would be
measured by the actual harm experienced by the plaintiff rather than by some independent measure of the defendants’ degree of carelessness. See supra notes 26–
34 and accompanying text.
211
See supra notes 26–34 and accompanying text.
212
As noted in supra note 6, there has been long-standing debate about use of
the term “proximate cause” to identify and label this requirement of the prima
facie case of negligence. The latest Restatement of Tort (Third) very consciously
abandons the term in favor of a prima facie requirement it calls “Limitations on
Liability for Tortious Conduct.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 (AM. L. INST. 2010), and the lengthy justification for this decision offered. Id. at § 29, Reporters’ Notes cmt. a.
209
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long-time presence in the prima facie case of negligence can be satisfactorily explained in no other way.213
While the design and policy purpose of the proximate cause requirement can be accurately identified, the practical task remains
difficult.214
I use the term “proximate cause” for this requirement, position it as a second, separate aspect of the causation requirement of the prima facie case, and define it in terms of reasonable foreseeability because it is my sense that, regardless
of the merits of the Restatement (Third)’s (and others’) different choices, this way
of articulating and organizing the doctrine is among the most standard and conventional ways of doing so. See e.g., Marshall v. Nugent, 222 F.2d 604, 610 (1st
Cir. 1955) (“[T]he courts continue generally to use ‘proximate cause,’ and it is
pretty well-understood what is meant”); DOBBS, supra note 24, at 448 (“For
greater clarity, some thinkers would prefer to drop the term proximate cause because the term wrongly suggests that the issue is about causation. . . . Pervasive
professional usage, however, makes it difficult to drop the term entirely.”); Patrick
J. Kelly, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the Present
Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L. Q. 49, 49 (“In negligence cases, our courts require the
plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s negligence was a ‘proximate cause’ of the
plaintiff’s injury.”); Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Proximate Cause, the Proposed Basic
Principles Restatement, and Products Liability, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1085, 1088
(2002) (“Third Restatement is succinct and to the point, but it seeks to lead courts
to language they do not, for the most part, presently use. At present, courts typically employ unadorned foreseeability language rather than result-within-the-risk
language when analyzing proximate cause. Also, of course, most courts continue
to use the phrase ‘proximate cause,’ which the proposed Restatement relegates to
a chapter heading parenthetical.”).
Moreover, and more importantly, the understanding of proximate cause offered herein, and the central role that the genuine social responsibility and fault of
the defendant plays in its purpose and design, remains the same across a variety
of different approaches to the surface labelling and articulation of what is essentially the same concept, including the one adopted by Restatement (Third).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 29, Reporters’ Notes cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2010) (“[T]he foreseeability test many
courts employ in negligence cases for proximate cause is quite compatible with
the standard in [Section 29].”); see also VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER,
WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 356 (11th ed. 2005);
KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, at 281; HARPER ET AL., supra note 6, at 177–78.
213
See James & Perry, supra note 201, at 784 (“It should be noted at this point
that many courts and legal writers have stressed the fact that policy considerations
underlie the doctrine of proximate cause. Of course they do, but the policies actually involved often fail to get explicit treatment.”).
214
See id. (“Another policy consideration which pervades all the cases [regarding proximate cause] is the need to work out rules which are feasible to administer, and yield a workable degree of certainty.”).
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At a black letter, doctrinal level, the key concept employed by
proximate cause doctrine is foreseeability.215 The central notion is
that a person is not genuinely socially responsible for a given consequence—is not morally at fault for that result—if the result could
not be reasonably foreseen by the actor under the circumstances at
the time the triggering behavior was engaged in.216 One cannot be
fairly blamed for having caused a result if that result was not reasonably foreseeable to the actor, even if the actor was one of the
actual causes of the harm.217 This is, as a general matter, a rather
impressive attempt to capture the essence of our collective, consensus sense of moral responsibility in a single, simple concept usable
by laypersons who serve on juries.218
Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., 469 P.2d 783, 786 (Or. 1970) (“The
specific question before us is, then, whether plaintiff’s injury and the manner of
its occurrence was so highly unusual that we can say as a matter of law that a
reasonable man, making an inventory of the possibilities of harm which his conduct might produce, would not have reasonably expected the injury to occur.
Stated in another way, the question is whether the circumstances are out of the
range within which a jury could determine that the injury was reasonably foreseeable.”).
216
See Neering v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 50 N.E.2d 497, 503 (Ill. 1943) (“What
constitutes proximate cause has been defined in numerous decisions, and there is
practically no difference of opinion as to what the rule is. The injury must be the
natural and probable result of the negligent act or omission and be of such a character as an ordinarily prudent person ought to have foreseen as likely to occur as
a result of the negligence . . . .”).
217
Doe v. Garcia, 895 P.2d 1229, 1234 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995) (“Thus, [while]
a negligent act may meet the ‘but for’ or ‘substantial factor’ test, so as to be a
cause in fact, the defendant may not be liable because it was not reasonably foreseeable that defendant’s act would lead to the harm suffered by the plaintiff.”).
218
One possible objection to the decision made by Restatement (Third) to recast the proximate cause requirement away from reasonable foreseeability and
toward a test based on whether the harm that resulted was among the risks that
made the defendant’s conduct unreasonably careless is that such a move takes
focus away from the fault status—the moral status—of the particular defendant in
that specific negligence case. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 33 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2010). Compared to
reasonable foreseeability, the harm-within-the-risk test embraced by Restatement
(Third) frames the inquiry as being somehow apart, or distanced, from the specific
defendant’s set of considerations and choices faced under the particular circumstances of the case. It thereby shifts, at least subtly, the fact-finder’s attention away
from the issue of that one defendant’s moral status. See id. As a result, fact finder
focus is also shifted away from the underlying policy question of whether that
defendant’s choice to act as he or she did caused the defendant to be genuinely
215
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For example, imagine two friends deciding together where to go
out for dinner. Person 1 prefers a certain restaurant while the other,
Person 2, prefers another establishment. Ultimately, after some debate, the two friends drive to the restaurant preferred by Person 1.
When they return to the car in the parking lot after the meal, they
find it badly damaged, with no witnesses or messages present to explain how or why. While Person 1 is clearly a but-for actual cause
of this unhappy consequence, in that it would not have occurred had
the friends not gone to the restaurant he or she preferred, Person 1
cannot reasonably be said to be genuinely at fault for the harm to the
car because he or she could not have reasonably foreseen that going
to that restaurant might result in such damage.219
Unless the risk of the harm that actually occurred is reasonably
part of the calculus concerning the actor’s (the defendant’s in a negligence claim) judgment and behavior, the actor cannot appropriately be blamed, socially or morally, for that resultant harm, even if
the resultant harm would not have occurred but for the actor’s behavior.220 Harm in such circumstances is, in common parlance, a
pure accident, implying that no one is to blame for it.221
socially responsible for the resulting harm. In addition, the shift from reasonable
foreseeability to harm-within-the-risk arguably burdens the jury with a more abstract test without any corresponding benefit in terms of greater accuracy in identifying genuine social fault. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
219
Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., 469 P.2d 783, 786 (Or. 1970) (“Foreseeability is an element of fault; the community deems a person to be at fault only
when the injury caused by him is one which could have been anticipated because
there was a reasonable likelihood that it could happen.”); Di Ponzio v. Riordan,
679 N.E.2d 616, 618 (N.Y. 1997) (“Foreseeability of risk is an essential element
of a fault-based negligence cause of action because the community deems a person at fault only when the injury-producing occurrence is one that could have been
anticipated.”).
220
Noon v. Knavel, 339 A.2d 545, 549 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975) (“It is well settled
that the appellant ‘could be properly liable only with respect to those harms which
proceeded from a risk or hazard the foreseeability of which rendered its conduct
negligent.’” (quoting Metts v. Griglak, 264 A.2d 684, 687 (Pa. 1970))); Maltman
v. Sauer, 530 P.2d 254, 258 (Wash. 1975) (“The hazard that brought about or
assisted bringing about the result must be among the hazards to be perceived reasonably and with respect to which defendant’s conduct was negligent.” (emphasis
omitted)).
221
This is in contrast to the ordinary language use of the concept of coincidence, which implies both no fault and no actual cause. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 Reporters’
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Like the but-for test and actual cause, foreseeability as a measure
of proximate cause is elegant, in that it is simple and can be quickly
and well understood by persons serving on juries.222 Unlike the butfor test, however, which yields largely determinate results, reasonable foreseeability when applied to a range of normal, common circumstances often yields uncertain and indeterminate results.223 It is,
in fact, among the most uncertain, unpredictable, and indeterminate
doctrines in all of tort law.224
Notes cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2010) (“Many scholars agree that accidental tortfeasors should not be held liable for harm that is outside the scope of the risk that
made the act tortious . . . .”).
222
Which is not to say that the reasonable foreseeability test yields confident
and consistent results when applied by jurors to the facts of specific cases. It is
one thing for a test itself to be simple and easily understood and a different thing
altogether for that test to be determinate and definite when implemented.
223
See Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 196 (Wyo. 1986) (“[The foreseeability] test is so vague that it has little practical value.”); Jeffrey A. Ehrich, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Case for an Independent Duty Rule in
Minnesota, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1402, 1429–30 (2011) (“Many courts from
other jurisdictions have also soundly criticized the foreseeability approach for its
vagueness, unpredictability, and subjectivity.”); Jessie Allen, The Persistence of
Proximate Cause: How Legal Doctrine Thrives on Skepticism, 90 DENV. U. L.
REV. 77, 91 (2012) (“[T]he basic indeterminacy of doctrinal proximate cause,
which bedevils judges, academics, and law students to this day, was fully articulated over eighty years ago.”).
224
One of the reasons for the widely observed indeterminacy of proximate
cause is that the doctrine, whether articulated in terms of reasonable foreseeability
or harm-within-the-risk, is necessarily structured as a matching test, requiring that
a match be determined to exist between the dangerous attributes of the defendant’s
behavior and the harm actually suffered by the plaintiff. See supra note 220 and
accompanying text. Given this, the likelihood of a match being found to exist will
in significant part be a function of how narrowly or how generically both the risk
and the harm is characterized. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
For example, imagine a situation in which the defendant is driving and at
the same time staring intently at his phone. While distracted in this way, he drives
his car off the side of a city avenue and strikes at moderate speed a pole supporting
traffic lights hanging over the approaching intersection. This impact causes the
traffic lights to fall to the ground. When they do, a person who at the time was
walking lawfully in a crosswalk in the intersection sees the traffic lights beginning
to fall and, without turning, runs backwards in the intersection as fast as he can.
In doing so, this person runs hard into the plaintiff, physically injuring him.
The defendant is clearly an actual cause of the plaintiff’s harm. Is he also
a proximate cause? The answer leans toward the negative if the question is framed
as being whether one of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of staring at
one’s phone while driving is striking a support for traffic lights that in turn causes
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For example, consider the hypothetical situation described
above, in which Defendant 1 fails to apply the brakes on his car in
time and, as a result, collides with the car directly in front of him at
a red light, a car owned by the plaintiff. There is little doubt that the
collision with the plaintiff’s car, the one right in front, is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of failing to apply the brakes. What if
the collision with that car causes it to move forward and collide with
a third car, a car directly in front of plaintiff’s car? Is such harm
reasonably foreseeable to the defendant? What if the third car, when
struck, moves forward into the intersection and is struck by a car
moving on the cross street? Is that harm reasonably foreseeable to
the defendant? What if the driver in the third car, when struck, reflexively activates the horn on the car, which in turn startles a driver
on the intersecting road who swerves into an adjacent lane and
thereby strikes yet another car? And on and on. While easy agreement and consensus is likely achievable in obvious cases on both
ends of the spectrum, there are a very large number of conventional
circumstances in which juries can be expected to be uncertain, and

the lights to begin to fall, which in turn causes a pedestrian to flee in fear, which
in turn causes the plaintiff to be struck by that person and injured. It leans toward
the positive if the proximate cause question is framed as being whether unreasonably dangerous driving reasonably foreseeably results in physical injury to a
nearby pedestrian walking on the same road.
While this specific-generic dimension of the factual characterization of the
proximate cause test will in a given case inevitably play a large role in influencing
the judgment of the trier of fact, especially when that trier of fact is a jury of
laypersons, the choice of a more specific or more generic framing of the test is
completely unrelated to the underlying purpose of the proximate cause requirement, and thus there is no principled way in which to choose among varying possible degrees of specific or generic characterization.
See Marshall v. Nugent, 222 F.2d 604, 610 (1st Cir. 1955) (“[The test for
proximate cause] does not furnish a formula which automatically decides each of
an infinite variety of cases. Flexibility is still preserved by the further need of
defining the risk, or risks, either narrowly, or more broadly, as seems appropriate
and just in the special type of case.”); CLARENCE MORRIS & C. ROBERT MORRIS,
JR., MORRIS ON TORTS 163–67 (2d ed. 1980); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmt. i (AM. L. INST. 2010) (“No
rule can be provided about the appropriate level of generality or specificity to
employ in characterizing the type of harm for purposes of this Section.”).
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perhaps in disagreement, regarding the question of reasonable foreseeability.225
Apart from the frequent indeterminacy of reasonable foreseeability itself, the underlying concept of genuine social responsibility—genuine social fault—is likely a subtle and multi-factor judgment that is only loosely captured by a simple reasonable foreseeability test, and it likely shifts and changes over time and across different jurisdictions.226 For instance, it is probably the case that many
persons’ sense of a given defendant’s genuine social responsibility
for particular harm that was actually caused by the defendant’s conduct is to some extent a function of the degree of blameworthiness,
or unreasonableness, of the defendant’s harm-producing conduct.227
In the example above, it is more likely that Defendant 1 will be
deemed to be genuinely socially responsible for some of the more
remote harm (e.g., the collisions involving the third car) if the reason
for Defendant 1’s failure to apply the brakes was a high level of
voluntary inebriation as contrasted with a sudden distraction from a
nearby vehicle, even though the foreseeability of harm is the same
in both instances.228 One’s sense of another’s blameworthiness for
subsequent harm most likely expands and contracts with the degree
of blameworthiness of the other’s harm-producing behavior, though
this factor is not captured by the black letter approach to proximate
cause nor the conventional proximate cause jury instruction, both of
which focus only on reasonable foreseeability.229
225
Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 443 (Tenn. 1996) (“The foreseeability
approach . . . provides little, if any, concrete guidelines for trial courts and juries
to use in deciding how each case should be resolved.”); Eric A. Johnson, Dividing
Risks: Toward a Determinate Test of Proximate Cause, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV. 925,
927 (2021) (“In practice, though, the foreseeability test proves hopelessly indeterminate.”).
226
See supra note 218 and accompanying text; see also supra note 223 and
accompanying text; see also infra note 227 and accompanying text.
227
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 33(b) (AM. L. INST. 2010) (“In general, the important factors in determining the scope of liability are the moral culpability of the actor, as reflected in
the reasons for and intent in committing the tortious acts, the seriousness of harm
intended and threatened by those acts, and the degree to which the actor’s conduct
deviated from appropriate care.”).
228
See id.
229
It must be admitted that the understanding of the causation requirement
offered herein does not promise much greater specificity or much less vagueness
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Understanding that the function of a proximate cause requirement in negligence is the limiting of negligence liability to only
those defendants who are genuinely socially responsible for the
plaintiff’s harm provides a powerful perspective from which to
make sense of the traditional instances in which courts take the proximate cause judgment away from juries and instead decide the issue
as a matter of law.230 These are particular circumstances in which
the proximate cause issue is determined by a preexisting rule of law
and not by the discretion of jurors.231
From the perspective of the account of the causation requirement
offered herein, one would expect that taking away discretion from
the trier of fact and resolving the proximate cause issue by preexisting rule would make sense in circumstances in which there is a substantial risk that the outcome of a literal, empirically focused foreseeability test will fail to accurately identify genuine social responsibility by the defendant.232 In the same way that the concurrent
cause and Summers v. Tice exceptions to the but-for test for actual
in actual application. A proximate cause requirement properly understood to be
all about identifying genuine social responsibility might, however, help to explain
that persistent lack of determinism in as much as its target and its goal—genuine
social responsibility—is itself an inherently vague and value-laden notion that
changes over time and regions, especially in an increasingly diverse society.
Moreover, this perspective might encourage pause, and perhaps some skepticism,
when encountering attempts to recast or to redesign the proximate cause requirement in ways that cause it to generate more definite and predictable results. This
is the case because, given the intended target of the requirement, more definite
and predictable tests are likely to generate more inaccurate results and underlying
errors of both over and under inclusion. See id. at § 29 Reporters’ Notes cmt. e
(“There is, in short, much play in the proximate-cause joints. The appropriate
scope of liability and responsibility is inherently a subject resistant to any rigorous
formulation, and it is a mistake to expect any more precision than a subject will
bear.”).
230
Steven F. Friedell, Nobody’s Perfect: Proximate Cause in American and
Jewish Law, 25 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 111, 118 (2002) (“[T]he courts
have established categorical rules that deprive the jury of any say in resolving
many proximate cause issues.”); see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 31–32 (AM. L. INST. 2010).
231
Stamas v. Fanning, 185 N.E.2d 751, 753 (Mass. 1962) (“There are situations where it can be said, as a matter of law, that a cause is remote rather than
proximate.”); Jay Tidmarsh, A Process Theory of Torts, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1313, 1385 n.257 (1994) (“[T]here is no shortage of cases deciding the issue of
proximate cause as a matter of law.”).
232
See Tidmarsh, supra note 231, at 1385 n.257.
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cause are needed to respond to instances of under inclusiveness, exceptions to the usual practice of having foreseeability determined by
the trier of fact are needed to respond to instances of under inclusiveness of the reasonable foreseeability test for proximate cause.233
One such instance applies to cases in which the defendant’s unreasonably careless behavior results in the plaintiff being the later
victim of subsequent medical malpractice.234 The relevant issue in
these cases is whether the defendant’s unreasonably careless behavior is a proximate cause of the additional harm suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the subsequent medical malpractice.235 Understandably, many courts confronted with this issue express the view that
the defendant is genuinely socially responsible—is fully morally at
fault—for the subsequent harm suffered by a plaintiff from medical
malpractice to which the plaintiff was subjected only as a result of
the defendant’s unreasonably careless behavior.236 And yet from an
empirical perspective, in the overwhelming percentage of cases, the
likelihood of a given person (a victim of prior negligence or not)
experiencing unreasonably careless medical treatment is far lower
than 50%, especially since this rule applies without exception to
malpractice engaged in by established medical providers, like hospitals.237 From an empirical perspective, it is difficult-to-impossible
233

See id.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 35 (AM. L. INST. 2010) (“An actor whose tortious conduct is a factual
cause of harm to another is subject to liability for any enhanced harm the other
suffers sue to the efforts of third persons to render aid reasonably required by the
other’s injury, so long as the enhanced harm arises from a risk that inheres in the
effort to render aid.”). The Restatement (Third) observes that this rule enjoys “virtually unanimous acceptance” and that “[n]egligence in medical treatment of a
tortuously caused injury is the most common invocation of the rule.” Id.
235
See id. at § 35 cmt. b.
236
See, e.g., Benoit v. United States, No. 98-858X, 2000 WL 1134472, at *7
(Fed. Cl. July 28, 2000) (“[I]t is an established general principle of American law,
however, that the original tortfeasor is liable for any aggravation of injuries subsequently caused by the negligence of others, including physicians.”); Weber v.
Charity Hosp. of La., 475 So. 2d 1047, 1050 (La. 1985) (“[A] tortfeasor may be
liable not only for the injuries he directly causes to the tort victim, but also for the
tort victim’s additional suffering caused by inappropriate treatment by the doctor,
nurse or hospital staff member who treats the injuries directly caused by the tortfeasor.” (citations omitted)).
237
The Harvard Medical Practice Study, published in 1991, concluded that
adverse events, defined as “an injury that was caused by medical management
234
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for a decision maker to reasonably conclude that the occurrence of
an event far, far less than 50% likely to happen was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.238
The dissonance in these cases between the likely outcome of the
conventional treatment of proximate cause by way of the reasonable
foreseeability test—a conclusion of no proximate cause—and the
existence of genuine social responsibility by the defendant mandates
that in order to align the outcome of the negligence claim with the
underlying policy that socially justifies the doctrine, courts must apply an exception that removes discretion from the jury and dictates
a finding that the defendant was a proximate cause of the harm suffered by the plaintiff as a result of subsequent medical malpractice.239 A similar analysis makes policy sense of, and thus rationalizes, the other recognized instances of proximate cause as a matter
of law.240

(rather than underlying disease) and that prolonged the hospitalization, produced
a disability at the time of discharge, or both,” occurred in 3.7% of hospitalizations.
Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients – Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I, 324 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 370, 370–71 (1991). The Utah-Colorado Medical Practice Study found
an adverse event rate of 2.9%. Eric J. Thomas et al., Incidence and Types of Adverse Events and Negligent Care in Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 261, 265
(2000). See generally Maxine M. Harrington, Revisiting Medical Error: Five
Years After the IOM Report, Have Reporting Systems Made a Measurable Difference?, 15 HEALTH MATRIX 329, 332 (2005) (discussing the difficulty in estimating the incidence of medical error); Kathryn Zeiler & Gregory Hardy, Law, Technology, and Patient Safety, 68 DEPAUL L. REV. 459, 460 (2019) (examining possible methods of improving medical adverse event count accuracy).
238
See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
239
Montgomery v. S. Cnty. Radiologists, Inc., 168 S.W.3d 685, 690 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2005) (“A party who commits an act of negligence is liable for all damages
caused by the act of negligence, including later medical malpractice caused by a
second party.”); Rucks v. Pushman, 541 So. 2d 673, 675 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1989), reh’g. denied, 549 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 1989) (“When a tortfeasor negligently
or intentionally injures a victim and the victim, in obtaining necessary treatment
for those injuries, is further injured (or her existing injuries are aggravated) by the
negligence of the health care providers, the law is now clear that the original (initial or primary) tortfeasor is liable to the victim not only for the original injuries
received as a result of the initial tort, but also for the additional (or aggravated)
injuries resulting from the subsequent negligence of the health care providers.”).
240
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 31–32 (AM. L. INST. 2010).
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One implication of the above analysis is that judges should bring
to bear the above understanding of proximate cause as a doctrinal
mechanism for limiting negligence liability to those defendants who
are deemed to be genuinely socially responsible for the plaintiff’s
harm when making decisions on what evidence and arguments
should be made available to jurors in negligence cases.241 Issues of
materiality, relevance, competency, and ultimate admissibility of
evidence regarding proximate cause should be considered in light of
an awareness that the fundamental task in the resolution of proximate cause is a determination of the defendant’s genuine social responsibility and not a literal, empirical analysis of the reasonable
foreseeability of the defendant under the specific factual circumstances of the case.242
A second implication of the above analysis is that judges should
bring to bear the above understanding of proximate cause when deciding motions that require a trier of law to determine what a reasonable trier of fact could or could not decide on the issue of proximate cause. Though recognized exceptions have been created and
exist in response to some instances of dissonance between empirical
reasonable foreseeability and genuine social responsibility, such exceptions are unlikely to adequately cover all such instances that may
arise in the wide range of factual circumstances that confront courts
in negligence cases.243 Judges should be sensitive to the possibility
of the existence of such dissonance and should decide motions for
summary judgment and directed verdict in such cases accordingly.244
Third, it may improve the accuracy of jury judgments in close
cases of proximate cause to include in model jury instructions on the
issue, more explicit explanation that the ultimate purpose of applying a reasonable foreseeability test to the facts of the case is to identify the existence, or lack, of genuine social responsibility by the
defendant for the plaintiff’s harm.245 Jury instructions that only set
forth the reasonable foreseeability test without broader context, as
most do, invite jurors to adopt an overtly literal, overly empirical
241
242
243
244
245

See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
COLEMAN, supra note 4, at 381.
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approach to the proximate cause requirement and thereby insufficiently recognize that the black letter reasonable foreseeability test
is less the sought after objective itself than it is an imperfect, surrogate measure of genuine social responsibility.246
Finally, the understanding of the underlying policy and function
of the proximate cause requirement offered herein may be relevant
to the long-standing lack of broad consensus on the proper doctrinal
placement of the reasonable foreseeability requirement in the prima
facie case for negligence.247 As illustrated and most often first encountered by law students in the classic case of Palsgraf v. Long
Island Railroad,248 there exists long-standing disagreement over
whether the reasonable foreseeability requirement of negligence
should be considered a part of the duty element of the prima facie
case of negligence, the causation element, or both.249 While a full

246

See, e.g., MISS. PRAC. MODEL JURY INSTR. CIV. § 14:3, Westlaw (2d ed.
Oct. update 2021) (“An element or test of proximate cause is that an ordinarily
prudent person should reasonably have foreseen that some injury might probably
occur as a result of [his/her/its] negligence. It is not necessary to foresee the particular injury, the particular manner of the injury, or the extent of the injury.”)
(emphasis and brackets in original).
247
See infra note 249 and accompanying text.
248
See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928).
249
See Busta v. Columbus Hosp. Corp., 916 P.2d 122, 133–40 (Mont. 1996)
(“[F]rom an early point in American jurisprudence there was disagreement among
knowledgeable scholars regarding the role of foreseeability in the formulation of
negligence law. The conviction, as expressed by Cardozo, was that without foreseeability there was no duty, and without duty there could be no liability. The
view as expressed by Andrews was that foreseeability was an element of proximate cause and reflected the practical political judgment of whether effect of
cause on result was too attenuated.”); Sabina v. Yavapai Cnty. Flood Control
Dist., 993 P.2d 1130, 1134 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (“More substantial is the question whether summary judgment for the District may be sustained for lack of duty
or proximate cause. As Prosser tells us, these categories often intersect. . . . This
case brings us precisely to the intersection of duty and proximate cause”); DOBBS,
supra note 24, at 449 (“In fact, some courts will use the language of proximate
cause to resolve some cases that other courts might resolve in the language of
duty.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 29 Reporters’ Notes cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2010) (“The Restatement Second of Torts is ambiguous about whether the requirement that the harm be within
the scope of the risk is a duty requirement or a proximate-cause requirement.”);
see also supra note 6 and accompanying text. See generally Kelly, supra note
212, at 53–54, 97–98 (discussing the origin and historical development of the lack
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consideration of this aspect of tort law resides outside the scope of
this Article, it should be noted that except in circumstances where
an empirical approach to reasonable foreseeability might result in a
conclusion different from one based on the defendant’s genuine social responsibility, the resolution of proximate cause in negligence,
based ultimately on the issue of genuine social responsibility, is fundamentally an appreciation and application of current social notions
of fault, blameworthiness, and moral responsibility.250 Such considerations are, by their nature, heavily value-laden, culturally-contingent, and are most appropriately deliberated and resolved collectively by members of a jury rather than by a single judicial decision
maker.251 As between the two, a group of layperson jurors can be
argued to far better bring to the case a current and accurately varied
sense of community attitudes toward social responsibility than can
a single jurist.252 Thus, as much as possible, the reasonable foreseeability requirement that is an uncontested part of the prima facie case
of consensus on conceptualizing the proximate cause limitation on liability as being part of the duty requirement or the causation requirement of negligence).
250
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 17 n.91 (1984)
(“Proximate cause imports notions of legal and moral responsibility for injury that
transcend mere physical location in a causal chain.”); David G. Owen, Figuring
Foreseeability, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1277, 1295 (2009) (“[F]oreseeability is
the most salient outer boundary defining the ‘scope’ of moral responsibility for
risks of harm.”).
251
Am. Pfauter, Ltd. v. Freeman Decorating Co., 796 F. Supp. 347, 352 (N.D.
Ill. 1992) (“Application of the concept of ‘proximate cause’ to the circumstances
of this case involves a value-laden determination properly left to the judgment of
the trier of fact.”); Linda C. Fentiman, Are Mothers Hazardous to their Children’s
Health?: Law, Culture, and the Framing of Risk, 21 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 295,
330 (2014) (“[M]odern tort scholars recognize that the determination of both actual and proximate cause is inevitably value-laden, reflecting cultural attitudes
about individual and corporate responsibility . . . .”).
252
See Marshall v. Nugent, 222 F.2d 604, 611 (1st Cir. 1955) (“When an issue
of proximate cause arises in a borderline case, as not infrequently happens, we
leave it to the jury with appropriate instructions. We do this because it is deemed
wise to obtain the judgment of the jury, reflecting as it does the earthy viewpoint
of the common man–the prevalent sense of the community–as to whether the
causal relation between the negligent act and the plaintiff’s harm which in fact
was a consequence of the tortious act is sufficiently close to make it just and expedient to hold the defendant answerable in damages. That is what the courts have
in mind when they say the question of proximate cause is one of fact for the
jury.”); see also KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT

2022]

THREE KINDS OF FAULT

211

for negligence should be more specifically conceived as being an
element of the causation requirement. In other words, the requirement should be viewed and treated as an issue of fact in the case,
rather than serving as a formal limit defining the legal duty of care
as an issue of law.253
CONCLUSION
The requirement that a plaintiff prove that the defendant personally caused the harm for which the plaintiff is seeking redress is fundamental to tort law, including the tort of negligence.254 This causation requirement has been the subject of long and intense interest
among legal scholars, and courts have long struggled with it, in part
because of its larger role in tort theory and doctrine, and because of
the complexity that lies in its more challenging issues.255 Recently,
the centrality of the causation requirement in areas beyond torts has
attracted the attention of the United States Supreme Court.256
This Article seeks to contribute to this ongoing discussion by
highlighting the value of appreciating the critical role that fault plays
in the causation requirement. It makes the case that one critical role
of causation in the tort of negligence is to limit the ultimate liability
generated by the tort to only those defendants who are thought in
light of contemporary values and standards to be genuinely socially
LAW 142–43 (3d ed. 2007) (“In the jury room, the commonsense principle underlying proximate cause—that negligent defendants should not always bear liability
to all the people or for all the harm they have caused, because at some point liability must stop—can be put into practice.”).
253
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 6 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2010) (“The first element [of negligence], duty, is
a question of law for the court to determine”); see also id. at § 29 Reporters’ Note,
cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 2010) (“Thus, the best that courts can do is to employ the
most attractive available framework for setting limits on liability, to decide the
cases whose outcome is clear and about which reasonable persons could not disagree, and to rely on the judgment of juries in those cases where application of
the standard yields an uncertain result.”); Di Ponzio v. Riordan, 679 N.E.2d 616,
618 (N.Y. 1997) (“The existence and scope of an alleged tortfeasor’s duty is, in
the first instance, a legal question for determination by the court.”).
254
Larry A. Alexander, Causation and Corrective Justice: Does Tort Law
Make Sense?, 6 LAW & PHIL. 1, 1 (1987) (observing that the requirement of causation is so critical that it is the “fundamental building block of all tort law”).
255
See supra notes 3, 4, 6 and accompanying text.
256
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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responsible for the plaintiff’s harm. Appreciation of the causation
requirement as a doctrinal mechanism for ensuring that this kind of
fault is possessed by all liable defendants offers a powerful way of
understanding the separate functions of actual cause and proximate
cause, and their respective tests, as well as the purpose and proper
contours of the various exceptions that courts have recognized to
those causation elements.257 Moreover, it offers valuable guidance
in approaching the development and implementation of causation
doctrine moving forward.258

257
258

See supra Sections V–VI.
See supra note 229.

